Matros, A.;
(2001)
Players with fixed resources in elimination tournaments.
(ELSE Working Papers
43).
ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
We consider T-round elimination tournaments where players have fixed resources instead of cost functions. We show that players always spend a higher share of their resources in early than in later rounds in a symmetric equilibrium. Equal resource allocation across T rounds takes place only in the winner-take-all case. Applications for career paths, elections, and sports are discussed.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Players with fixed resources in elimination tournaments |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2001 |
| Language: | English |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14653 |
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