Farningham, RPH;
(2006)
Concept-directed transcendental arguments.
Masters thesis , UCL (University College London).
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Abstract
This thesis assesses a type of transcendental argument known as a 'concept- directed transcendental argument'. Transcendental arguments are arguments that attempt to specify the necessary conditions for experience or another feature of our mental life. A concept-directed transcendental argument is an argument that specifies that the possession of a certain concept is a non-trivial necessary condition for experience or some other feature of our mental life. The thesis argues that concept- directed transcendental arguments are a viable type of argument and that certain token concept-directed transcendental arguments appear to be successful. Chapter 1 examines Barry Stroud's (1982) objections to transcendental arguments and argues that concept-directed transcendental arguments are unaffected by them. Chapter 1 also assesses the general interest in looking at concept-directed transcendental arguments and whether they are anti-sceptical, anti-concept empiricist, or anti-conventionalist when sound. It is contested that sound concept- directed transcendental arguments are typically anti-conventionalist. Chapter 2 looks at a concept-directed transcendental argument for the sortalist thesis that the possession of some sortal concepts, which are a type of concept, is non-trivially necessary for the judgement of objects and for the perception of objects. It is argued that a good case can be made for the former claim, but not for the latter claim. Chapter 3 looks at one further concept-directed transcendental argument. It is a concept-directed transcendental argument for the thesis that the concept 'substance' or 'object' is a formal concept whose possession is necessary for the possession of sortal concepts. It is argued that a plausible case can be made for this thesis. Chapter 4 looks briefly at the relationship transcendental idealism and transcendental realism have to concept-directed transcendental arguments. It is argued that difference between transcendental idealism and transcendental realism is less significant than commonly supposed. Further, it is contended that the specific concept-directed transcendental arguments considered appear to be independent of transcendental idealism and transcendental realism.
| Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
|---|---|
| Title: | Concept-directed transcendental arguments |
| Identifier: | PQ ETD:594060 |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Thesis digitised by ProQuest. Third party copyright material has been removed from the ethesis. Images identifying individuals have been redacted or partially redacted to protect their identity. |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1446371 |
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