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Concept-Directed Transcendental Arguments\textsuperscript{1}

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Submitted for degree of M.Phil in Philosophy

\textsuperscript{1} I would like to thank my parents, Marian and David Farningham, for the loving support they have given me on this course. Were it not for their financial generosity, this course would have been unfeasible. I would also like to thank my supervisor, Quassim Cassam, whose supervisions have been thoroughly rewarding. To anyone who has read his work, his influence on this thesis is clear. I have no doubt that I have made the greatest philosophical progress under his own supervision.
I, Roderick Farningham, declare that this thesis is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or submitted for the award of any other degree at any institution, except where due acknowledgment is made.

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Date ......3/14/36.............
Abstract

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This thesis assesses a type of transcendental argument known as a ‘concept-directed transcendental argument’. Transcendental arguments are arguments that attempt to specify the necessary conditions for experience or another feature of our mental life. A concept-directed transcendental argument is an argument that specifies that the possession of a certain concept is a non-trivial necessary condition for experience or some other feature of our mental life. The thesis argues that concept-directed transcendental arguments are a viable type of argument and that certain token concept-directed transcendental arguments appear to be successful.

Chapter 1 examines Barry Stroud’s (1982) objections to transcendental arguments and argues that concept-directed transcendental arguments are unaffected by them. Chapter 1 also assesses the general interest in looking at concept-directed transcendental arguments and whether they are anti-sceptical, anti-concept empiricist, or anti-conventionalist when sound. It is contested that sound concept-directed transcendental arguments are typically anti-conventionalist.

Chapter 2 looks at a concept-directed transcendental argument for the sortalist thesis that the possession of some sortal concepts, which are a type of
concept, is non-trivially necessary for the judgement of objects and for the perception of objects. It is argued that a good case can be made for the former claim, but not for the latter claim.

Chapter 3 looks at one further concept-directed transcendental argument. It is a concept-directed transcendental argument for the thesis that the concept 'substance' or 'object' is a formal concept whose possession is necessary for the possession of sortal concepts. It is argued that a plausible case can be made for this thesis.

Chapter 4 looks briefly at the relationship transcendental idealism and transcendental realism have to concept-directed transcendental arguments. It is argued that difference between transcendental idealism and transcendental realism is less significant than commonly supposed. Further, it is contended that the specific concept-directed transcendental arguments considered appear to be independent of transcendental idealism and transcendental realism.
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Chapter 1  Concept-Directed Transcendental Arguments an Introduction

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Chapter 1

As the abstract detailed, the focus of this thesis is concept-directed transcendental arguments. The essential point of this chapter is to explain the nature of concept-directed transcendental arguments, show that they are prima facie viable as a type of argument, and outline the general interest in looking at them. This will lay the path for looking at the specific concept-directed transcendental arguments in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 that try to show that the possession of some sortal concepts, the concept ‘substance’ or ‘object’ is necessary for some feature of our mental life.²

The structure of this chapter is as follows: (1) the related notions of a transcendental argument and a concept-directed transcendental argument are explained; (2) Barry Stroud’s (1982) objections to transcendental arguments are detailed and it is argued that concept-directed transcendental arguments are immune to Stroud’s objections and an obvious reformulation of them; (3) it is determined whether successfully uncovering the conceptual necessary conditions for experience has anti-sceptical, anti-concept empiricist, or anti-conventionalist consequences; (4) the explanatory value of concept-directed transcendental arguments is outlined.

The notion of a transcendental argument and a concept-directed transcendental argument is introduced in the abstract. Let’s remind ourselves of the meaning of these notions. Arguments that purport to uncover the non-trivial

² Some may suggest that the notions of ‘substance’ and of ‘object’ are not equivalent. However, the concept-directed transcendental argument considered can be salvaged from Wiggins (1982, 1997), who assumes these notions are equivalent.
necessary conditions for the possibility or actuality of experience are known as transcendental arguments. The paradigmatic starting point of transcendental enquiry is experience. The subject matter of transcendental arguments can be another significant feature of our mental life, such as language or our 'conceptual scheme' which covers the 'most basic and general' aspects of our cognitive and conceptual lives (Walker 1982: 16). Well known transcendental arguments include Kant's *Transcendental Deduction* and his *Refutation of Idealism*. According to Strawson, Kant's *Refutation of Idealism* starts from the fact that we have 'empirical self-consciousness' and says that this is only possible if we have 'an immediate awareness of objects in space' (1966: 125). The argument that our self-consciousness presupposes a direct perception of spatial objects is a transcendental claim for it consists in showing that the direct perception of spatial objects is a non-trivial necessary condition for self-consciousness. The type of transcendental argument that is the focus of this thesis is a 'concept-directed transcendental argument' (term taken from Stern 2004: 11). Since experience is the standard starting point of transcendental enquiry, we will talk about the conditions of experience for ease of exposition. A transcendental argument is a concept-directed transcendental argument if it specifies that certain concepts and conceptual capacities are non-trivially necessary for experience. Concepts whose possession is necessary for any experience are *conceptual necessary conditions* for any experience.

Now, let's look at Stroud's objections to transcendental arguments and determine whether concept-directed transcendental arguments are immune to them.
Stroud argues convincingly against the viability of a certain type of transcendental argument; namely, the type that is directed against the epistemological sceptic who denies that we know, say, the existence of things outside us or, say, the existence of other minds. Since the point of this type of transcendental argument is to refute a form of epistemological scepticism, it consists in showing that language or experience implies the existence of things outside us or the existence of other minds. Although Stroud doesn’t label this type of transcendental argument, following Robert Stern (2004: 11), it will be called a truth-directed transcendental argument, as it consists in showing that language or experience implies that a proposition about the world is true (such as, that objects or other minds exist). Stroud argues that Peter Strawson’s transcendental argument in Chapter 1 of Individuals (1959) is truth-directed. He says that it begins with the premise that ‘We think of the world as containing objective particulars in a single spatiotemporal system’ and, by a sequence of arguments, concludes that ‘Objects continue to exist unperceived’ (1982: 120-1). Some suggest that the purpose of Strawson’s transcendental arguments in Individuals was to ‘describe the actual structure of our thought about the world’ (1959: 9) and not to refute scepticism. Whether or not this is true, Stroud’s presentation of Strawson remains illustrative of what Stroud has in mind.

Stroud makes two sequential objections to truth-directed transcendental arguments. First, he argues that for any sentence about the world of objects, $S$, whose truth is implied by the possibility of language or experience,
‘...the sceptic can always very plausibly insist that it is enough to make language possible if we believe that S is true, or if it looks for all the world as if it is, but that S needn’t actually be true.’ (Stroud 1982: 128)

Second, he argues that the only way in which it can be shown that S must be true requires reliance

‘...on the principle that it is not possible for anything to make sense unless it is possible for us to establish whether S is true...hence the meaning of a statement would have to be determined by what we can know. But to prove this would be to prove some version of the verification principle.’ (Ibid: 129)

The first objection is that if a proposition, S, about the world is said to be true for experience or language to be possible, it is enough to make experience or language possible if S is only believed to be true. To return to Stroud’s presentation of Strawson, Stroud would say that all that can be claimed for our thought of the world as consisting of objects in a spatiotemporal system to be possible is that we must believe that objects to continue to exist unperceived, not that they actually do exist unperceived. In support, Stroud says that given that the starting point is ‘such psychological facts as that we think and experience things in certain ways’ one can always ask ‘how can truths about the world which appear to say or imply nothing about human thought or experience’ be necessary conditions? (1994a: 234)
underlying point is compelling, yet whether the underlying point is true, however, is not our real concern. Our concern is to understand Stroud's objections and decide whether they apply to concept-directed transcendental arguments. The second objection is that in order to show the stronger thesis – that S is actually true, not just believed to be true – then one has to claim that for language or experience or anything to make sense, it must be possible to know S is true. If the truth of S can't be known, then this amounts to 'a rejection of some of the necessary conditions of the existence of the conceptual scheme within which alone such doubts make sense' (1982: 120). Yet to say that the truth of S must be knowable for things to make sense is to appeal to a form of the verification principle. Since variants of the verification principle can be appealed to independent of truth-directed transcendental arguments, the result of this appeal is that it renders such arguments dialectically redundant.

Are concept-directed transcendental arguments immune to these objections? Since the second objection is turned to if the first objection applies, let's concentrate on the first. The obvious, yet perhaps naïve, response is that concept-directed transcendental arguments are immune to Stroud's first objection as it's intended for truth-directed transcendental arguments, not concept-directed transcendental arguments. This response is naïve as it assumes that the type of argument the objection is intended for is the only type it actually affects. However, it appears that Stroud's objections implicitly endorse concept-directed transcendental arguments as being potentially viable. His objection that 'the sceptic can always very plausibly insist that it is enough to make language possible if we believe that S is true' (1982:
128) implies that it can be plausible to claim that the possibility of language or experience implies the belief that $S$ is true. Such transcendental arguments can be called *belief-directed* transcendental arguments (Stern 2004: 11). Further, if belief-directed transcendental claims are plausible, then concept-directed transcendental claims are plausible; since if the possibility of experience implies the belief that $S$ is true, then it implies the possession of the concepts required to grasp $S$'s content. This follows from the truth that if a subject believes that $S$ then she has a particular propositional attitude toward a particular propositional content and so must possess the concepts required to grasp this content; if not, then she couldn’t grasp the propositional content and have any propositional attitude toward it, let alone the attitude she adopts.

Despite that Stroud’s objection implicitly endorses concept-directed transcendental arguments it can be reformulated in such a way that it may pose a threat to these arguments. The reformulated objection goes like this: in response to a concept-directed transcendental claim of the form that ‘possession of a concept $C$ is non-trivially necessary for the possibility of experience’, the sceptic ‘can always very plausibly insist that it is enough to make experience possible if we believe that we possess concept $C$, but that we needn’t actually possess it’. The neo-Stroudian objection is thoroughly off target, however. To remind ourselves: Stroud’s original objection is that the possibility of language or experience can only imply that we must believe that a proposition $S$ about the world (such as, that material objects exist or that other minds exist), not that it must actually be true. The objection is
apparently justified because it can't be assumed that psychological facts imply non-psychological facts; it can only be assumed that they imply further psychological facts. Yet, to the extent that concept-directed transcendental arguments are arguments that purport to show that experience implies the possession of certain concepts, concept-directed transcendental arguments already make a claim about psychological facts, not about non-psychological facts. The proposed neo-Stroudian objection is, therefore, misconceived. Unless the neo-Stroudian has another objection available, concept-directed transcendental arguments, as a type of transcendental argument, are *prima facie* viable.

If concept-directed transcendental arguments are *prima facie* viable, then it's important to consider the interest in looking at them. Given the absolute importance of concept-directed transcendental arguments for us, it's important to consider their historical heritage, their dialectical import, and any other reasons for looking at them. (By their 'dialectical import' the author means the philosophical positions sound concept-directed transcendental arguments can be expected to refute.)

One may suggest that it's a consequence of the previous discussion that concept-directed transcendental arguments aren't anti-sceptical for, unlike truth-directed transcendental arguments, they don't seek to establish the truth of a proposition \( S \) about the world. However, Kant's *Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts* is a concept-directed transcendental argument (which is evident by his description that it aims to show that the pure concepts should 'be recognised as a priori conditions of the possibility of experience' (A94/B126)), and some have
considered it to be an anti-sceptical transcendental argument. Stroud says that the 'transcendental deduction' is supposed 'to give a complete answer to the sceptic about the existence of things outside us' (1982: 117). Since concept-directed transcendental arguments only purport to show that experience implies the possession of certain concepts, how can anyone expect them to have any anti-sceptical force? Stroud offers material for the explanation of how this is possible. He says that, for Kant, if the possession of a concept, say, 'material object' is necessary for the possibility of experience, then this implies that '[material object] is objectively valid' which 'is tantamount to demonstrating that [material objects] actually exist' (1982: 129). If true, then concept-directed transcendental arguments are capable of being entirely anti-sceptical because the a priori demonstration that material objects exist refutes the epistemological sceptic who declares we can't know this. However, unless a certain picture of Kant's philosophical system is assumed to be true, no one would assume that a concept whose possession is necessary for the possibility of experience implies its objective validity in the sense defined because this assumption would be open for the sceptic to retort: isn't it enough to make experience possible that one merely believes that the concept 'material object' is instantiated, not that it actually is? Since we can make perfect sense of concepts that seem to be instantiated, but actually are not, the sceptic's retort would be triumphant.

As for whether the Deduction is an anti-sceptical argument, Kant is explicit that its starting point is that 'experience is knowledge by means of connected perceptions' (B161). The starting point of the Deduction, therefore, is that we have
empirical or perceptual knowledge. Kant takes empirical knowledge to be equivalent to perceptual knowledge. Yet, given that empirical knowledge can include inductive, abductive, deductive, and testimonial knowledge, each of which is not obviously a form of perceptual knowledge, Kant's intentions are most likely to be preserved if we substitute 'empirical knowledge' with 'perceptual knowledge'. Since the starting point of the Deduction is experience as perceptual knowledge, it's a starting point the epistemological sceptic will deny, for he denies that we have perceptual knowledge. Therefore, the Deduction can't be directed at refuting scepticism. Rather, it's directed at answering a question of right in respect of 'what right one uses and possesses' the pure concepts (18: 267). Kant thinks that the demonstration that 'the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience' will prove them to be 'valid a priori for all objects of experience' (B161) and answer the question of right. Read this way, the Deduction is 'Kant's validatory project' for the use of the pure concepts (Cassam 1999: 84).

What provoked the question of right in respect of the use of the pure concepts? Furthermore, why is the demonstration that the pure concepts are conditions of the possibility of experience expected to validate the pure concepts and answer the question of right? The key to the Deduction is working out what the pure concepts purport to be. Kant says they are concepts of objects that 'are marked out for pure a priori employment' (A85/B117). As concepts of objects marked out for a priori employment, they purport to apply universally and necessarily to objects. Yet,

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3 For further evidence that Kant thought of empirical knowledge as perceptual knowledge, cf. B147 and A176/B218.
4 All references of this form are to Kant (2005).
Hume’s critique of the pure concept of cause (and any of its sibling concepts) awoke Kant from his ‘dogmatic slumber’ and prompted doubts that the pure concepts genuinely are what they claim to be. Kant’s Hume argued that one can’t explain ‘how it can be possible that the understanding must think concepts, which are not in themselves connected in the understanding, as being necessarily connected in the object’ (B127). As such, Kant’s Hume held that the true origin of the pure concept of cause must be experience, which means that it’s nothing but an empirical concept ‘marked with a false stamp’ (my italics: 257-8). The question of right about the use of the pure concepts was therefore aroused by Hume’s critique of the concept of cause. Answering the question of right requires proving that the pure concepts are just what they purport to be: a priori concepts of objects. If the Deduction is sound then it implies the negation of concept empiricism – the thesis that all concepts are derived from experience – because then it would show that the pure concepts are a priori and not derived from experience. The Deduction’s dialectical import is its anti-concept empiricism.

How does Kant intend to demonstrate that the pure concepts are genuine a priori concepts of objects? The demonstration is called the ‘transcendental deduction’ and it is an ‘explanation of the manner in which’ the pure concepts ‘relate a priori to objects’ (A85/B117). The ‘manner in which they relate’ must be one that shows that ‘the representation [that is, a pure concept] alone must make the object possible’ and that ‘the representation is a priori determinant of the object, if it be the case that only through the representation is it possible to know anything as an object’
(A92/B125). If the pure concepts make the objects of experience possible, then this means that objects cannot be experienced unless they conform to the pure concepts. Kant says that this can only be shown if the pure concepts have an a priori origin in the understanding and that 'the understanding might itself, perhaps, through these concepts, be the author of the experience in which its objects are found' (B127). If this is successfully shown, then the pure concepts are a priori conditions of the possibility of experience as empirical knowledge of objects because they originate in the 'understanding [which] is itself the source of the laws of nature' (A127).

Since perceptual knowledge consists of intuitions and concepts, the 'principle...according to which the whole enquiry' is directed is that the pure concepts are a priori conditions of intuitions of objects and a priori conditions of thought about objects (A94/B126). Yet, if the pure concepts (or any other concepts for that matter) are necessary for thought about objects, doesn't this imply that the pure concepts are necessary for any perceptual knowledge of objects? It obviously does since any perceptual knowledge of an object implies a judgement about the object. For instance, if S perceives that the fire hydrant is red, then S thinks that the fire hydrant is red. Contrapositively, if S doesn't think that the fire hydrant is red, S doesn't perceive that the fire hydrant is red. So, if a concept C is necessary for thought about objects, such as S's thought that the fire hydrant is red, then C must be necessary for any perceptual knowledge of objects. Given this, what's added by saying that the pure concepts are necessary for any perceptual knowledge of objects? Kant's rationale for this is that if the pure concepts are necessary for thought about
objects, but not for intuitions of objects, then it's possible for objects to be presented in intuition that can't be thought. The pure concepts would be mere 'subjective conditions of thought' and not have 'objective validity' (A89-90/B122). It would be possible for our perceptual experiences to occur rhapsodically. Experiences that occurred rhapsodically would be unthinkable to the subject given that he can only think about objects by means of the pure concepts. Kant says that the pure concepts would be rendered 'altogether empty, null, and meaningless' (A90/B123). This apparently makes clear Kant's requirement that the pure concepts be necessary for thought about objects and perception of objects.

So, Kant wants to show that the pure concepts are necessary for thought about objects and necessary for intuitions of objects. The precise characterisation of the Kantian notion of an intuition is controversial, and suggestions of its character have been made by John McDowell (1998) and Wilfred Sellars (1968). We can make some general elucidations of the notion now, however. Kant thinks that intuitions are 'immediate' and 'singular' representations (A19 and B136n). Given this, intuitions should be thought of as perceptions. So, Kant's claim that perceptual knowledge implies intuitions (or perceptions) and concepts shouldn't be surprising to us. This interpretation may appear to be at odds with a problematic passage in the Prolegomena, where Kant says that Hume's problem:

'was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had never doubted; but
whether that concept could be thought by reason a priori, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all experience, implying a more widely extended usefulness, not limited merely to objects of experience. This was Hume’s problem. It was a question concerning the origin of the concept, not concerning its indispensability in use’ (259).

This passage suggests that demonstrating the origins and not the indispensability of the pure concepts is the point of the Deduction. Yet it has been argued in this chapter that the point of the Deduction is to show that the pure concepts have their origin in the understanding and not experience, and that the understanding, by means of the pure concepts, makes experience as perceptual knowledge of objects possible. The interpretation offered here, then, is that the Deduction hopes to show the a priori origins of the pure concepts and their necessity or indispensability for thought about and perception of objects. So, which interpretation is correct? Putting it crudely: it’s both because the sense of ‘indispensability’ employed in this passage is different to the sense which we have equated with ‘necessity’. Kant’s Hume thought that the pure concept of cause was indispensable ‘for our knowledge of nature’ because its possession was indispensable for judging about constant conjunctions, rather like possession of the concept ‘red’ is indispensable for judging about red things. Indeed, given the extent to which constant conjunctions pervade our experiences, ‘our knowledge of nature’ would be deeply impoverished if we lacked possession of the concept of cause. For Kant,
however, the concept of cause is indispensable for whatever may be presented to us in possible experience. Therefore, it possesses 'an inner truth, independent of all experience' that implies 'a more widely extended usefulness' than it does for Hume (259). The problematic passage should not, thus, be taken as suggesting that the problem of the Deduction is to do with the origins of the pure concepts and not their indispensability, where 'indispensability' means necessary for the possibility of experience.

The dialectical import of the *Deduction* is that it's directed against concept empiricism and not scepticism. It's directed against concept empiricism because it apparently shows that the pure concepts are genuine a priori concepts and, therefore, that there are certain concepts that are not derived from experience. Yet, the concept-directed transcendental arguments that will be considered in Chapters 2 and 3 concern the status of sortal concepts and the concept 'object'. If these arguments are to be anti-concept empiricist, then they must have the consequence that the relevant concepts cannot be derived from experience. It's worth considering whether there's a reasonable basis to the claim that *any* concept whose possession is necessary for experience cannot be derived from experience. A concept is not derived from experience if the mental skills or capacities it enables are not *acquired* from experience. As Cassam points out, if possessing a concept enables certain mental skills or capacities, 'it follows that acquiring a concept is a matter of acquiring a cluster of skills or capacities' (2003: 97). One suggestion made by Cassam is that a concept whose instances are found in experience is capable of being acquired from
experience (2003: 98). Instances of the concept ‘fire hydrant’ are found in experience and so the concept is capable of being acquired from experience. Although it’s hard to say how concept acquisition actually occurs, a version of the Lockean story of abstraction may be correct, where the subject compares individual fire hydrants, notices their similarities and differences, and abstracts the concept ‘fire hydrant’. Kant thinks the pure concepts can’t be acquired from experience because they aren’t instantiated in experience. In relation to the pure concept of cause, Kant says that although ‘experience continually presents examples of such regularity among appearances and so affords abundant opportunity of abstracting the concept of cause... we should be overlooking the fact that the concept of cause can never arise in this manner. It must either be grounded completely a priori in the understanding, or must be entirely given up as a mere phantom of the brain’ (A91/B123-4). Kant explains that this is so because the pure concept of cause ‘manifestly contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect’ (B5), whilst experience only informs us ‘what is so but not that it must necessarily be so, and not otherwise’ (A1). All of the pure concepts contain an a priori necessity or ‘dignity’ that can’t be ‘empirically expressed’ (A91/B124). In comparison, concepts derived from experience possess mere ‘comparative universality’ (B3). If Kant is correct, then it seems that the pure concepts can’t be derived from experience.

Yet, the concept type ‘sortal concept’ isn’t a pure concept and the concept ‘object’ or ‘substance’ needn’t be the same concepts as Kant’s pure concept of substance. Wiggins defines sortal concepts as concepts ‘whose extension
consists...of all the particular things or substances of one particular kind, say horses, or sheep, or pruning knives’ (1980: 7). Unlike Kant’s pure concepts, horses, sheep, and pruning knives can be found in experience. As for the concept of substance, its content may be close to the Kantian pure concept of substance, which is the concept of that which is subject and never mere predicate (B149). David Wiggins suggests the abstract concept of substance or object is the concept of ‘the determinable substance of some kind’ (1980: 5). Considered this way, the concept of substance is ‘highly abstract’ and doesn’t belong to ‘the vocabulary of particular observation’ (Strawson 1992: 115). Yet, to the extent that sortal concepts are instantiated, kinds of substances are instantiated, such as horses, sheep, and pruning knives. The instantiation of sortal concepts is an indirect instantiation of the concept of substance, and so the concept of substance is ‘found’ in experience indirectly by means of horses, sheep, and pruning knives.

If the direct or indirect instances of sortal concepts and the concept of ‘substance’ or ‘object’ can be found in experience, does this imply that these concepts can be derived from experience? One may say that the concepts cannot be acquired from experience because their possession is necessary for experience. As such, experience can only happen if we possess them and can’t occur ‘before’ and ‘apart from’ their possession. Yet, this response is unsatisfactory. The concept empiricist can point out that just because the possession of certain concepts is said to be necessary for experience as perceptual knowledge of objects it doesn’t follow that their possession is necessary for any type of experience. We take it that a new born
infant's experience doesn't imply the possession of sortal concepts because new born infants don't have sortal concepts. This is not to say that the content of a new born infant's experience isn't sufficiently rich to involve the representation of objects as causal or as members of sortals or kinds of substances, for representing something as $F$ may not imply the possession of the concept 'F'. Given that a new born infant will experience the direct and indirect instances of sortal concepts and the concept of substance, it's plausible that he will acquire these concepts through interacting directly with these instances and learning about them through proficient language users. His acquisition of these concepts will be derived from experience in some sense. It's only when a new born infant has developed a sufficient level of conceptual sophistication for perceptual knowledge of objects that possession of the said concepts is implied. Yet despite this implication, the acquisition of the concepts would remain empirical. The concept empiricist, therefore, has a readily available, and quite reasonable, reply.

If so, then this may seem to raise doubts about the dialectical import of concept-directed transcendental claims. However, there is another philosophical opponent who may be targeted in our dialectical crosshairs. Stroud claims that 'if a sound transcendental argument can be produced' a 'conventionalism...will be refuted' (1982: 119). Conventionalism is defined as the thesis that there are no concepts whose possession is necessary for experience or thought. Concept-directed transcendental arguments 'are supposed to prove that certain particular concepts are

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5 Cf. E.S. Spelke and G.A. Van der Valle, 'Perceiving and Reasoning about Objects: Insights from Infants', in Eilan, McCarthy, and Brewer (eds.), *Spatial Representation*. 
necessary for experience or thought; they establish the necessity or indispensability of certain concepts...If there are particular concepts which are necessary for thought or experience then it is false that, for every one of our present concepts, we could dispense with it and still find the world or our experience intelligible.’ (1982: 119). Likewise, if ‘we must believe that there are material objects and other minds in order for us to be able to speak meaningfully at all...[this] would not prove scepticism is self-defeating, it would refute a radical scepticism of the kind outline earlier. It would then be demonstrably false that, for every one of our present concepts, we could dispense with it and still find our experience intelligible’ (1982: 130). That Stroud thinks that sound concept-directed transcendental arguments can defeat conventionalism is interesting. Stroud’s article is often thought of as the coup de grace of transcendental arguments and frequently appealed to on blind authority. Yet, Stroud explicitly endorses concept-directed transcendental arguments as anti-conventionalist arguments. Given that sound concept-directed transcendental arguments show that certain concepts are non-trivially necessary for experience as perceptual knowledge of objects, we should endorse them as anti-conventionalist as well. Is there room for the conventionalist to manoeuvre against a sound concept-directed transcendental argument? A conventionalist may try to question that such arguments are anti-conventionalist on similar grounds to the objection that they’re anti-concept empiricist; namely, that if the possession of certain concepts is necessary for perceptual knowledge this doesn’t imply that their possession is necessary for experience of some other type, such as infant experience. Yet, if a
conventionalist chooses give the response that his position is that there are no indispensable concepts for a type of experience weaker than perceptual knowledge, then his position becomes uninteresting, for we take conventionalism to be a position about the experience we adults have. If a conventionalist is intransigent about this, there are plenty of other conventionalists who would dispute the non-trivial necessity of any concepts for perceptual knowledge of objects and it is these conventionalists that form the dialectical import of concept-directed transcendental arguments.

'Kant's validatory project' was earlier identified as consisting in showing that the pure concepts are genuine a priori concepts of objects and are not, therefore, derived from experience. By implication, it was positively anti-concept empiricist. Yet, if we're unsure about whether all concept-directed transcendental arguments can be anti-concept empiricist, does this mean they don't perform a validatory function? The validatory aspect of these arguments is, to some extent, contextual. The possession of a concept, or its use in some way, gives rise to a question of right and a doubt about its validity if its possession or its use in some way is controversial. The claims that the possession of sortal concepts or the concept of object is necessary for experience imply that these concepts are indispensable. The claims are, therefore, controversial insofar as the conventionalist denies them. Since these claims are denied by the conventionalist, proving them will validate sortal concepts and the concepts of substance and causality insofar as the possession of these concepts is necessary for experience.
However, the purpose of elucidating the conceptual conditions for experience isn’t just validatory; it’s *explanatory* for it explains ‘why it is important for us to think of and experience the world in certain ways rather than others’ (Cassam 1999: 109). In the words of one philosopher, such explanations are the ‘goal of philosophy’ for they ‘assist men to understand themselves and thus operate in the open, and not wildly, in the dark’ (Berlin 1999: 11). Sound concept-directed transcendental may not promise the explanatory prizes Isaiah Berlin urges, but we can be sure that they promise a better understanding of ourselves and our relationship to the world.

Before concluding, the related notions of ‘possessing a concept’ and ‘using a concept’ deserve elucidation. The correct ontology of concepts is philosophically controversial. Kant’s own theory of concept possession, Jonathan Bennett argues, is that possessing ‘a concept is being in a mental state which endows one with certain abilities’ (1966: 54). The alternative theories of concept possession are that possessing a concept is possessing a mental ability, a Fregean sense, or a representational mental particular. It’s consistent with each of these views that the possession of concepts enables mental abilities. The mental abilities concept possession enables depends on the type of concept possessed. The typical mental abilities enabled are inferential or recognitional abilities. Take the possession of logical concepts, possession of such concepts enables logical mental abilities. For instance, possession of the logical concept of conjunction enables one to infer that if

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6 The view that concepts are mental abilities is defended by Brandom (1994), Dummett (1993), Millikan (2000), and Geach (1957). The view that concepts are representational mental particulars is defended by Fodor (1998). The view that concepts are Fregean senses is defended by Peacocke (1992) and Zalta (2001).
$P$ is true and $Q$ is true then $P$ and $Q$ is true. Whereas, possession of recognitional concepts enables recognitional mental abilities. For example, possession of the recognitional concept ‘chair’ enables one to recognise instances of the concept ‘chair’ as instances of the concept ‘chair’. Possession of the concept ‘chair’ also allows one to judge about chairs, where possession of the concept is implied by the judgement, as it is with the judgement ‘the chair is sturdy’. The notion of using or employing a concept is distinct to that of possessing a concept. Using a concept $C$ implies possessing the concept $C$ whilst possessing the concept $C$ doesn’t imply using the concept $C$. There are many concepts that we currently possess but are not using. The concepts we use at any given time are the concepts whose possession is implied by the contents of our *occurrent* and *conscious* propositional attitudes. For example, if one calculates at $t_0$ that $1 + 0 = 1$, then one uses at $t_0$ the concepts of the number one, zero, plus, and equivalence.

In this chapter we have explained and outlined transcendental arguments and concept-directed transcendental arguments. It is argued that concept-directed transcendental arguments are immune to Stroud’s objections. It is argued that the typical interest in looking at concept-directed transcendental arguments is that they are anti-conventionalist. They also have an explanatory role. The next chapter will look at specific concept-directed transcendental arguments for the conclusion that the possession of sortal concepts is necessary for thought about objects and for perception of objects.
Chapter 2

This chapter will look at two concept-directed transcendental arguments. The first is a concept-directed transcendental argument for the conclusion that any thought about objects non-trivially implies the possession of a sortal concept. The position that this thesis is true will be called sortalism about thought. The second is a concept-directed transcendental argument for the conclusion that any perception of an object non-trivially implies the possession of a sortal concept. The position that this is true will be called sortalism about perception. Since perceptual knowledge of objects is a propositional knowledge and the proposition it concerns involves a thought about an object, the truth of the conclusion of the first concept-directed transcendental argument would imply that any perceptual knowledge of objects implies the possession of a sortal concept. Similarly, since any perceptual knowledge of objects implies a perception of an object, the truth of the conclusion of the second argument implies that any perceptual knowledge of objects implies the possession of a sortal concept.

It will be argued that a good case can be made for the conclusion that the possession of sortal concepts is non-trivially necessary for any thought about objects. The case begins with the introduction of Russell's Principle that thinking about an object requires \textit{knowing which} object one is thinking about. It will be contested that the only way of \textit{knowing which} object one is thinking about is by \textit{knowing what sort} of object one is thinking about. Russell's Principle leads us to the necessity of sortal concepts for thought about objects. The second thesis the possession of sortal
concepts is non-trivially necessary for any perception of objects is argued to be implausible, however. Since objects presented in perception are presented as ‘articulated unities’, it is not clear why the possession of sortal concepts would be necessary to perceive objects (Hirsch 1982: 107).

It is important to say more about the nature of sortal concepts, given their importance for this chapter. Wiggins says the extension of a sortal concept ‘consists...of all the particular things or substances of one particular kind, say horses, or sheep, or pruning knives’ (1980: 7). So, the predicates ‘is a horse’, ‘is a sheep’, and ‘is a pruning knife’ are each sortal predicates that stand for sortal concepts. Aristotle calls sortals or kinds of substances ‘secondary substances’. So, horses, sheep, and pruning knives are each different examples of secondary substances. Aristotle contrasts secondary substances with ‘primary substances’, which are particular individuals, such as a horse, a sheep, or a pruning knife. A sortal concept ‘gathers up a class of things that survive certain sorts of change, come into being in a certain specific way, tend to be qualified in certain specific ways, and tend to cease to be in certain specific ways’ (Wiggins 1997: 414). So, sortal concepts determine identity and persistence criteria for a kind of substance. Possessing a sortal concept, therefore, implies grasping the identity and persistence conditions for a kind of object. The identity criteria are the criteria under which an object is a member of a kind of substance and the persistence criteria are the criteria under which an object’s membership of a kind of substance can continue. For instance, it may be a necessary condition for an object’s being a television that the object has a viewing screen. So,
any object that doesn’t have a viewing screen isn’t a television. This condition would constitute one of the identity criteria for the substance kind ‘television’. It would also reveal a persistence criterion of an object’s remaining a television: that an object must keep its viewing screen to remain a television. Sortal concepts either stand for ‘phase sortals’ or ‘substance sortals’ (Wiggins 1980: 24-7). A phase sortal is a sortal that an object can cease to belong to without ceasing to exist. So, an object that is a television can no longer be a television without ceasing to exist; for example, it can have its viewing screen and electronic contents removed and function as a storage container instead. A substance sortal is a sortal than an object can only cease to belong to if it ceases to exist itself. ‘Human being’ is an example of a substance sortal as an object that is a human being but ceases to be one, ceases to exist. A subject who possesses a sortal concept has the capacity to determine whether an object is an instance of the sortal concept and whether an object is the same object he saw before.

The possession of sortal concepts allows one to individuate and to count objects, and to trace objects through space and time and reidentify them as one and the same (Wiggins 1980: 15). The issue is whether the possession of sortal concepts is necessary for judgement about and perception of objects. One way of approaching these claims is by means of ‘Russell’s Principle’, which Gareth Evans explains to be the ‘principle that a subject cannot make a judgement about something unless he knows which object is judgement is about’ (1982: 89).\(^7\) If Russell’s Principle is true

\(^7\) This way of approaching the problem was made perspicuous to me by Cassam 1997.
then it’s a necessary condition for judgement or thought about an object that a subject knows which object his judgement or thought is about. For Russell’s Principle to be relevant to sortalism about thought, it would have to be shown that the only way of the subject’s ‘knowing which’ object his thought is about is by knowing what sort of object it is about. Since knowing what sort of object one’s thought is about implies the possession of a sortal concept, Russell’s Principle would provide a direct means of getting to sortalism about thought. Yet, before looking at whether knowing which implies knowing what sort, it’s important to establish whether Russell’s Principle is true. If it’s not, then there’s no need to whether the said implication holds. Furthermore, if it’s true, it’s important to establish in what sense one needs to know which object one’s thought is about in order to think about the object.

Evans (1982) says that Russell’s Principle is trivial and vacuous if it’s interpreted as meaning that in order to know which object one’s thought is about, where one’s thought instantiates the schema that ‘O is F’, that one know that it is O one is thinking about. Likewise, it’s probably false, Evans says, if knowing which object the subject’s thought is about implies ‘the colloquial use of the expression “knows which”’ (Ibid.). He says that part of a subject’s knowing which object his thought is about involves ‘a capacity to distinguish the object of his judgement from all other things’ (Ibid.). The same point is put differently by Cassam: ‘a thinker will not count as having latched on to a particular item in the world and predicated something of it unless she has a capacity to distinguish the object of her judgement from all other things’ (1997: 123). Evans says that Russell thought that in order to
think about an object one must have a ‘discriminating conception of that object – a conception which would enable the subject to distinguish that object from all other things’ (1982: 65). This point is intended to be intuitive: if, *per impossible*, it weren’t possible to distinguish the object of one’s judgement from all other things, then there would be some things that one couldn’t distinguish the object of one’s judgement from, which would seem to imply that one’s judgement couldn’t latch on to the very thing it’s about. So, if, for example, *S* has the thought that the cup is chipped, yet *per impossible* there is a numerically distinct object that *S* can’t distinguish from the cup, then *S*’s thought will be unable to latch on to the cup instead of the numerically distinct object (and all other numerically distinct objects). *S*’s thought would, therefore, be impossible. So, given that *S* does have the very thought he has – the thought that the cup is chipped – *S* must be capable of distinguishing the object of his thought – the cup – from all other things.

Evans illustrates Russell’s Principle with an example where a subject observes ‘two indistinguishable steel balls suspended from the same point and rotating about it’ (1982: 90). Given that each steel ball appears to share all the same properties, there’s not an apparent basis on which the subject can discriminate one steel ball from the other. Furthermore, since *knowing which* object one’s thought is about requires employing a ‘discriminating conception’ of the object, where one discriminates it from all other objects, one is unable to think about one steel ball as opposed to another. Evans adds that ‘if one imagines oneself in this situation, and attempts to speculate about one of the balls rather than the other, one finds oneself
attempting to exploit some distinguishing fact or other’ (1982: 90). So, whenever one attempts to think about one steel ball, as opposed to another, one finds a discriminating feature, and in so doing one employs Russell’s Principle.

He also introduces a potential counterexample to the principle (Ibid.). Imagine a subject who observes a steel ball suspended from a single point and rotating about it. Then, imagine that the subject, at a later time, observes a numerically distinct steel ball indistinguishable to the one he observed earlier. Coupled with this, however, the subject forgets the steel ball he observed earlier. Years later, he recalls his observation of ‘that steel ball’. Evans admits it’s hard to know what to make of this example. On the one hand, the subject seems to be capable of thinking that it is ‘that steel ball’ and no other that is the object of his thought. On the other hand, Evans suggests, it’s not quite correct to say that the subject’s thought ‘that steel ball’ involves awareness that the reference of ‘that’ is the second steel ball, and not the first steel ball, he encountered several years earlier. Whether this is a genuine counterexample, therefore, is difficult to assess. Let’s put it aside for just now and look to see whether there’s a connection between knowing which and knowing what sort.

What is required for the thinker to distinguish objects of thought from all other objects and determine their reference? The suggestion made by Wiggins is that in order to know which thing one has referred to one must know what sort of object one has referred to. The same suggestion is made by Cassam, who puts it that ‘To delineate an object in thought is to draw its boundaries, and it makes no sense to
suppose that one can draw the boundaries of something in thought if one does not know what it is’ (1997: 123). The sort of object one has referred to is determined by its membership ‘of a class of continuants whose stereotype will be that members of the class survive certain sorts of change, *come into being* in a certain specifiable way, *tend to be qualified* in certain specifiable ways, *tend to behave* in certain specifiable ways, and *tend to cease to be* in certain specifiable ways’ (Wiggins 2000: 218-9). So, knowing what sort of object one has referred to implies knowing of which class of continuants it is a member, which implies knowing its identity, persistence, and existence conditions. Thus, it implies possessing a sortal concept under which it falls, a sortal concept being what a ‘sortal predicate must stand for’ and is that which ‘implicitly or explicitly determines identity, persistence, and existence conditions for members of its extension’ (Wiggins 1980: 62). Since the content of thought is conceptual, it’s trivial that the content of thought about an object implies the possession of a concept under which the object can fall. Yet, it needs to be assessed whether the possession of a sortal concept is necessary.

Let’s think of a specific example. In order for \( S \) to think about a particular object – let’s say a human man - then, by Russell’s Principle, \( S \) must know which object her judgement is about. Further, for \( S \) to know which object her judgement is about she must possess the sortal concept ‘human man’. This is because the sortal concept ‘human man’ determines certain criteria of identity according to which an object that satisfies them belongs to the extension of the sortal concept ‘human man’. If \( S \) didn’t possess the sortal concept ‘human man’ then \( S \) wouldn’t be able to think
of a human man. It may not seem clear, however, just why $S$ requires the possession of the sortal concept ‘human man’ in order to think about a human man. There are two ways in which one may wish to dispute that the possession of this concept is necessary. First, one may say that the possession of some other sortal concept is sufficient for thinking about the human man. So, for example, possession of the sortal concept ‘human being’ is a less determinate concept than the sortal concept ‘human man’ and the extension of the latter is a subextension of the former. The way to respond to this point is to qualify the initial claim to the following: $S$ requires the possession of a sortal concept under which the object that is the human man can fall. Obviously, any sortal concept under which the object falls will be a concept that is either a genera or species of the sortal concept ‘human man’. The second objection is that one can think of the object by means of a name, and that the name is a singular referring expression whose extension consists only of the particular object that it refers to. Let’s say that a particular chipped cup is $S$’s own cup and $S$ has named it ‘$S$ cup’. $S$ can have the thought ‘$S$ cup is chipped’ which doesn’t appear to imply the possession of the sortal concept ‘cup’ because ‘$S$ cup’ isn’t a sortal concept but a name. If the point of sortal concepts is to individuate objects that are members of sortals, then one must show why naming an object still involves the possession of a sortal concept. One way of doing this would be by showing that one can only name objects demonstratively, and since demonstrative identification implies the possession of a sortal concept, one can only name an object by means of the possession of a sortal concept. Whether this type of argument works will be looked at
in the second half, when we look at perceptual demonstrative judgements. Is there an independent way of responding to this objection? One may say that when $S$ thinks that ‘$S$ cup is chipped’, she still has to think of the object that is the reference of the name ‘$S$ cup’ as a member of a sortal kind. Thinking of an object as $F$ implies the possession of the concept ‘$F$’. So, thinking of the object that is the reference of the name ‘$S$ cup’ involves thinking of it as a member of a sortal kind, which implies the possession of the sortal concept of the sortal kind the object is a member of. Is this a plausible claim, however?

One way of arguing that $S$ needn’t think of the object as a member of a sortal is by suggesting that $S$ only uses a feature-placing language (Strawson 1959: 202). A feature-placing language is a language that endows its language users with the capacity to produce speech acts about the presence of non-objective features of the world around the language users. For example, ‘it is sunny’ and ‘it is draughty’ are both feature-placing sentences. As Cassam notes (1997: 126), a child can respond to actual objects with sentences whose content mimic or equal feature-placing sentences. A child who is met with the presence of a dog can respond ‘Dog!’ Yet, it doesn’t follow that the child thinks of the dog as a dog, that is, a member of a specific sortal kind. The child only thinks of the dog as a feature of her surroundings. Since she doesn’t possess the constitutive criteria for the dog’s identity and persistence, she doesn’t think of the dog as an object. Yet she does appear to think of the dog and to that extent singles it out in thought. The obvious response is that the child isn’t having a thought, but is rather just exhibiting a behavioural, albeit verbal,
response to the presence of a particular thing in her environment. The contents of thoughts are propositions and will typically exhibit a subject-predicate structure. Grasping the contents of thoughts implies the possession of the concepts necessary to specify their content. Clearly, the verbal expulsion ‘Dog!’ doesn’t have a structure, nor does it imply that the child possess the concept of a dog. Indeed, to the extent that the concept of a dog is a sortal concept, the child’s possessing it would presumably allow the child to have more sophisticated intentional states with respect to the dog, such as judgements. The possibility of a feature-placing language doesn’t create problems, therefore.

Michael Dummett provides the best route for showing sortalism about thought. As Dummett claims, ‘any reference to objects, properly so called, and any predication of objects, involves the tacit or explicit invocation of a criterion of identity’ (1981: 218). The challenge for he who denies sortalism about thought is to show that reference to particular objects or predication of particular objects doesn’t imply the application of criteria of identity. Since reference to objects would be impossible (and therefore predication of objects too) without grasping the criteria under which objects can be identified, and grasping an object’s identity criteria is grasping a sortal concept, it’s very hard to argue against sortalism about thought. Therefore, it seems that to think an object one must possess a sortal concept under which it can fall.

I shall now look at the case for sortalism about perceptions of objects. Bill Brewer says that perceptual experience is ‘the world’s direct impact upon a person’s
mind' (1998: 205). Sortalism about perception of objects is the thesis that in order to perceive objects one must possess some sortal concepts. We can distinguish between a strong variety of sortalism and a moderate variety. The strong variety or 'strong sortalism' is the thesis that in order to perceive an object $O$ one must possess a sortal concept under which $O$ falls. The moderate variety or 'moderate sortalism' is the thesis that in order to perceive an object $O$ one must possess some sortal concepts. Plainly, strong sortalism implies moderate sortalism, but not vice versa – one can possess some sortal concepts, but not the sortal concept $O$ under which the object of one's perception can fall under.

It's important also to say something about the type of perception that should be the subject matter of this transcendental enquiry. One type of perception ruled out can be called simple perception, after Fred Dretske's (1969) more restrictive notion 'simple seeing'. I shall explain Dretske's notion of simple seeing and the correlate notion of simple perception and then show why neither of these types of perception could form the basis of our transcendental enquiry. Dretske says that one simple sees objects. Dretske says that simple seeing is a 'successful exercise [that] is devoid of positive belief content' (1969: 6). Dretske defines 'positive belief content' as content that entails that a subject $S$ 'has a particular belief, or set of beliefs' (5). If a subject simple sees an object, therefore, it doesn't follow that the subject has a particular belief or set of beliefs (and so it doesn't follow that the subject has a particular belief or set of beliefs about the object). Dretske likens the cognitive achievement of simple seeing to that of 'stepping on'. Neither achievement has a positive belief content. In
connection, both achievements are also extensional. From the point of view of simple seeing, this means that if a subject \( S \) simple sees an object \( O \), of a sentence of the form ‘\( S \) simple sees \( O \)’ any description of ‘\( O \)’ can be substituted \textit{salva veritate}. Clearly, something symmetrical can be said of the ‘stepping on’ relation. We can understand simple perception as the broader cognitive phenomenon of which simple seeing is one of its determinate instances (the others being simple tactility, simple gustation, simple audition, and simple olfaction). Can simple perception be the starting point of our transcendental enquiry into the conceptual conditions of perception? Earlier it was pointed out that our interest in perception lay in the fact that perceptual knowledge of objects, trivially, implies a perceptual element. It may be that this perceptual element is a complex cognitive achievement consisting of simple perception as well as more complex perceptual achievements. However, given that simple perception is extensional, it can’t be argued that it has conceptual necessary conditions for the content of simple perception is non-conceptual. A content is non-conceptual if ‘In order for subjects to be in a state with a content \( p \), they do not have to possess the concepts which are canonical for \( p \)’ (Crane 2001: 152). The extensionality of simple perception means that if a subject \( S \) simple perceives an \( O \) then this doesn’t imply a positive belief content, that is, a content of the form ‘that \( O \) is \( F \)’. So, \( S \)’s simple perception doesn’t imply the possession of a sortal concept under which \( O \) can fall. Our starting point has to be a form of perception more cognitively significant than simple perception. I will introduce two further types of perception and discuss their merits in turn as suitable candidates for
the starting part of our transcendental enquiry. The first type is the type mentioned earlier known as ‘perceiving that’ which is analogous to Dretske’s notion of epistemic seeing (which divides into primary epistemic seeing and secondary epistemic seeing). The second type is ‘perceiving as’. If a subject perceives that such-and-such, the such-and-such of his perception is a proposition. In order to perceive that such-and-such the subject must possess the concepts necessary to grasp the proposition’s content. If the subject perceives that the cup is chipped the subject requires possession of the concepts ‘cup’ and ‘chipped’ in order to grasp the propositional content of his perception. Perceiving that is factive. If a subject perceives that a proposition then the proposition must be true. Perceiving that is also judgemental. It’s judgemental because the content of perceiving that is judgemental or propositional. If one perceives that the cup is chipped one judges that the cup is chipped. There is a distinction between perceiving that and judging that because whilst the former implies the latter, the latter doesn’t imply the former. One can judge that without perceiving that, as one does when one remembers the events of the evening before and judges that one shouldn’t have drunk so much. Yet, one can’t perceive that without judging that because perceiving that is taking a judgemental stance towards the content of one’s perceptions. Unlike simple perception, perceiving that is intensional or non-extensional. How does perceiving that contrast with perceiving as? Like perceiving that, perceiving as is intensional. I can perceive the same object as blue or as red depending on the lighting conditions. Consequently, perceiving as fails the tests for extensionality. Perceiving an object $O$ as $F$ doesn’t
imply that $O$ is $F$. When presented with the Müller-Lyer illusion, where two lines are placed parallel to each other, one above the other, but at either side of the top line two inverted arrow heads touch and point towards the line and at either side of the bottom line two arrow heads touch and point away from the line, a subject will perceive one line as being longer than the other. Yet, given that the lines are of equal length, the subject perceives something as being the case that in fact isn’t. Perceiving as isn’t factive, therefore. In connection, to the extent that one can perceive one line as longer than the other, but can believe that the lines are of equal length (by being told that they are), perceiving as doesn’t imply judging that.

It seems that there are only two candidates for our transcendental enquiry into the conceptual conditions of perception. The type of perception investigated can be perceiving as or perceiving that. Since the first part of the chapter looked at the conceptual conditions for judging that, the judgmental component of perceiving that is already spoken for. If we take away the judgemental component of perceiving that, what are we left with? This can be answered if we reconsider the Müller-Lyer illusion in a variant form. Let’s consider a subject who is unaware of the Müller-Lyer illusion and who is presented with a visual image of something that would appear to someone who is aware of the Müller-Lyer illusion as a presentation of the illusion. However, the actual presentation the subject receives isn’t an illusion for one of the lines is genuinely slightly longer than the other. So, whilst someone who knows about the Müller-Lyer illusion would see the image and judge falsely that both lines are of equal length, our ignorant subject judges truly that both lines are of unequal
length. The point is that when a subject perceives something as being the case, the subject can judge that it is the case or not. Whether the subject judges truly depends on what is in fact the case. Yet, the subject’s background beliefs will affect whether or not she judges as being the case what she perceives as being the case. The judgemental component of perceiving that is logically independent of what we perceive as being the case. That’s not to say that what we perceive as being the case doesn’t present to us a propositional content – the propositional content is the very thing that is represented as being the case. Yet, it does mean that the component of thought implied by perceiving that is the same component discussed in the first half of this chapter. To the extent, therefore, that simple perception and factive perception are inadequate starting points of transcendental enquiry (the former because it’s extensional, the latter because the relevant component has already been discussed), the only alternative is that we discuss whether perceiving as implies the possession of sortal concepts.

An initial an obvious difficulty that presents us is that the claim that perceiving $O$ as $F$ implies the possession of the concept ‘$F$’ is highly controversial. The thesis that this implication holds is called ‘perceptual relativism’ (term taken from Crane 1992: 136). The thesis is generally held to be implausible because how we perceive things as being exhausts our conceptual capacity to articulate fully the content of experience. At the time being, I am looking at the desk underneath my laptop. It is presented to me in perception as being variegated. Although I possess the colour concept ‘tan’ which correctly applies to certain of the table’s shades, I don’t
possess enough colour concepts to articulate the full range of colours the table instantiates. Yet, whilst perceptual relativism may be controversial, extreme and moderate sortalism about perception of objects are relatively moderate views, for they insist that it is the possession of sortal concepts that is necessary for perceiving objects.

So, can it be plausibly maintained that the possession of sortal concepts is necessary for perception of objects? One way of thinking about perception is by noting its close connection to demonstrative judgement. Brewer says that perceptual experiences ‘are essential to a person’s grasp of certain demonstrative contents’ (1998: 218). Do such judgements imply the possession of sortal concepts? As with descriptive judgements, demonstrative judgements imply the individuation or singling out of the object of judgement. In particular, the subject, who demonstratively judges ‘That is F’, has the capacity to discriminate the object of her judgement from all other things. Wiggins says that to ‘isolate x in experience; to determine or fix upon x in particular by drawing its spatio-temporal boundaries and distinguishing it in its environment from other things of like and unlike kinds’ (1980: 5). For sortalism about perception to be true, the subject would have to employ sortal concepts in order to make demonstrative judgements about the contents of her perception.

One suggestion made by Eli Hirsch (1982) is the notion of ‘articulation’ which is an ‘elementary sortal-neutral idea’ as being the means by which we pick out objects of experience (1982: 106). In reference to a car, which a child who does not
have the sortal concept ‘car’, ‘observes…moving across a field’ it seems natural to suppose that the child ‘would pick the car out as a unitary object’ (Ibid.). Hirsch, therefore, thinks that a subject’s ‘sortal ignorance with respect to a given object will typically not prevent the object from presenting itself as an articulated unity, as something that stands out from its surroundings’ (1982: 107). Hirsch highlights a number of ‘articulating-making’ factors, such as ‘boundary contrast’, where a ‘portion of matter seems to impress itself upon as a unity insofar as it is segregated, bound off, from its surrounding’ (Ibid.); ‘qualitative homogeneity’ of the surface of an object; ‘separate movability’, where the object moves as a unit; ‘dynamic cohesiveness’, where an object has a capacity ‘to hang together when subjected to various strains’; ‘regularity of shape’, which is exhibited by trunks of trees whose ‘cylindrical shapes are in some sense simple’ (1982: 108); ‘joint-formation at boundaries lacking contrast’ (1982: 109).

So, Hirsch’s claim is that the articulation of the object in experience is what allows the subject to single it out and use it as the subject of a demonstrative judgement. If object articulation enables perceptual demonstrative judgement, and object articulation is independent of the possession of sortal concepts, then sortalism about perception is a false thesis. For Hirsch, at least, object articulation is independent of the possession of sortal concepts, so its truth amounts to the falsity of sortalism. It’s important to consider whether it amounts to the falsity of moderate or strong sortalism. If we imagine a subject who singles out an object of perception – let’s say a chair – and makes a demonstrative judgement about it – let’s say ‘that has
four legs' – but who doesn't possess the sortal concept 'chair' then if this is a true description of the case then it only implies the falsity of strong sortalism, for it says nothing about whether the subject possesses sortal concepts under which other objects can fall. What about strong sortalism? For the refutation of moderate sortalism, we would need a genuine case where a subject can demonstratively judge about an object even though he possesses no sortal concepts whatsoever. If we return to the last example, does it become implausible when we supplement it with the assumption that the subject lacks any sortal concepts? The chair that is the object of his perception and his judgement would still be presented as an articulated unity, and he seemingly would still be capable of judging about it. Strong and moderate sortalism about perception are, thus, implausible.

This chapter looked at the case for sortalism about thought of objects and (strong and moderate) sortalism about perception of objects. The case for the former thesis appears relatively strong, but not so for the latter thesis.
Chapter 3

This chapter will look at one concept-directed transcendental argument. The first is a concept-directed transcendental argument for the conclusion that the concept 'physical object' is a formal concept whose possession is non-trivially necessary for the possession of any sortal concepts. It is proposed in Chapter 1 that the paradigmatic starting point of transcendental enquiry is experience as perceptual knowledge of objects. Yet, the argument considered here purports to show that there are certain conceptual necessary conditions for the possession of sortal concepts. One of the conclusions of Chapter 2 is the tentative conclusion that a good case can be made for the non-trivial necessity of the possession of sortal concepts for judgement about objects, which implies that a good case can be made for their necessity for perceptual knowledge of objects. If the former implication genuinely holds, then a spelling out the conceptual necessary conditions for the possession of sortal concepts is a spelling out some of the conceptual necessary conditions for perceptual knowledge of objects. It is also noted in Chapter 1 that transcendental enquiry can begin from claims about our cognitive and conceptual lives. Looking for the conceptual necessary conditions, if any, for the possession of sortal concepts is in keeping with this suggestion.

The first of the two concept-directed transcendental arguments is found in Wiggins (1980, 1997). Wiggins says that his 'view has always been that formal concepts such as object are essential to our thought' (1997: 418). He defines the
concept 'object' as a 'bounded, coherent, three-dimensional object with some particular way of behaving, coming to be, being, being qualified, and passing away' (1997: 417). The concept 'object' is the concept 'material body' or 'physical object'. It is a 'determinable concept' since its content 'does not specify which kind' of physical object it encompasses (1997: 419-20). Rather, its content only encompasses the abstract notion of a physical object of some determinable kind. Wiggins also includes the concepts 'entity', 'space-occupier', and 'substance' in his list of formal concepts (1980: 63). The contents of these concepts are not logically equivalent. For instance, the Cartesian theory of the soul is that the soul is an immaterial substance. On this reading, substance is not equivalent to material object, for substances can be immaterial, whilst, of course, material objects cannot. Something similar could be said about the nature of an entity. Wiggins takes a more restricted reading of 'entity' and 'substance', which is why they are treated as equivalent to 'object'.

The concept 'object' is alleged to be necessary for our thought because its possession is necessary for the possession of sortal concepts, whose possession, Wiggins holds, is necessary for thought about individuals. He offers a number of arguments for the claim that this concept is implied by the possession of sortal concepts. Wiggins also tries to argue against the claim, contended by Fei Xu (1997), that the concept 'object' is a sortal concept and not a formal concept. It is worth explaining why the concept 'object' cannot be a sortal concept and a formal concept. Certainly, some of our concepts can be individuated by a number of functional roles; for instance, the concept 'conjunction' is a logical concept and a grammatical
concept. The particular concept ‘object’ cannot play the dual roles of being a sortal concept and a formal concept, however. As Wiggins explains, a formal concept ‘has no individuative force of its own’ (1980: 63). It is not capable, therefore, of picking any kind of physical object out. Additionally, a formal concept cannot answer the ‘what is it?’ question. A sortal concept, on the other hand, is supposed to individuate or pick out a kind of physical object. It also informatively answers the ‘what is it?’ question.

Since the concept ‘object’ cannot be a formal concept and a sortal concept, we need to consider Wiggins’ positive arguments for the formality of the concept ‘object’ and his negative arguments against Xu’s thesis that it is a sortal concept. It will be contested that there is a strong case for regarding the concept ‘object’ as a formal concept; and, therefore, as a concept whose possession is necessary for the possession of sortal concepts.

Before looking at Wiggins’ arguments, it is worth explaining Xu’s own approach for establishing the thesis that the concept ‘object’ is a sortal concept. Xu’s article is divided between trying to show that the concept ‘object’ is a sortal concept for children and trying to show that the concept retains this status for adults. Xu attempts to settle the former issue through the purported results of certain child psychology experiments, where children’s behavioural responses to the behaviour of certain objects is tested and observed. Xu takes it that the children in these experiments tend to behave in such a way that indicates that they are employing the concept ‘object’ as a sortal concept. Yet, as Wiggins highlights the important
question to consider is whether we, *qua* adults, could function with the concept 'object', under Xu's interpretation of its role, 'as our one and only sortal concept' (1997: 413). If philosophical reflection leads us to think that we, *qua* adults, could not function with the concept 'object' as our only sortal concept, then this calls into the question the thesis that the concept 'object' has sortal status at all.

Wiggins' principal argument relies on the claim that any individuation of physical objects by a subject involves individuating it as a specific kind of object. He argues that as 'soon as a conscious subject begins to treat a thing to be individuated as possessed of a nature or particular mode of activity, this subject is *already* exercising some however minimal or tentative or experimental conception of a specific kind of thing' (1997: 414). To have a conception of a kind of thing, Wiggins says, is 'to be able to exercise a grasp or understanding of the concept' of that thing (Ibid.). If Wiggins is right that individuation of a thing always implies individuating it as a specific kind of thing, then it appears that the concept 'object' cannot be a sortal concept, for whenever one individuates a physical object one is committed to individuating it as something more specific than a physical object, such as a chair or a dog.

Wiggins (1997) tries to establish this thesis about individuation through the consideration of a number of cases in which an observer encounters objects for which he lacks the specific sortal concept under which they fall. In one case, a number of rubber balls are bouncing quickly in a small enclosure. Whenever the rubber balls appear to make contact with each other, the subject who lacks the sortal
concept 'rubber ball', cannot yet discern whether or not the rubber balls bounce off each other or go through each other. In another case, there are a number of rubber ducks that have the ability to open up and extend themselves, revealing membrane which alien objects can pass through and can reseal afterwards. These are released along with the rubber balls. When two rubber ducks collide, one may pass through the other. When a ball collides with a rubber duck it may pass through it. When two balls collide they deflect each other.

Wiggins' problem is that if a subject possesses only the purported sortal concept 'object', which is the concept of a 'bounded, three-dimensional physical object that moves as a whole', how could she notice the differences in the way objects behave, where some collide and deflect each other and others pass through each other? The difference in how these objects behave can only be accounted for by the 'enrichment' of the concept 'object' through the employment of more specific sortal concepts.

The idea apparently generalises. The former examples concerned the ways objects may interact with each other on coming into contact with other objects of the same or different kind. But, an object's moving alone 'from one place to another has half-hidden conceptual complexities' that the concept 'object' underdetermines the representation of it (Wiggins 1997: 417) An object's moving is a 'way of behaving' (Ibid.). If we consider a car's moving versus a person's moving. Although both a person and a car are bounded, three-dimensional physical objects that move as wholes, a person moves in a way very distinct to how a car moves. The concept
‘object’ fails to capture this difference. Wiggins thinks given that this difference is captured, however, in our experience, we must have at least a conception of the sortal concept ‘person’ and the sortal concept ‘car’. So, it seems that we can’t help but employ a specific sortal concept and, therefore, that it is impossible for us to possess the concept ‘object’ as the only sortal concept.

What reasons does Wiggins offer for the formality of the concept ‘object’? Wiggins says that the concept ‘object’ is a determinable concept. Specifically, it is the concept of a ‘bounded, coherent, three-dimensional object with some particular way of behaving, coming to be, being, being qualified, and passing away’ (Wiggins 1997: 417). He argues that we must possess this concept because ‘we need it in order to talk in any general way about identity, difference, persistence; we need it to think about Leibnizian congruence, etc. as a general condition of identity; and we need it to understand what the general distinction amounts to between rebound and passing through’ (Ibid.). Assessing the truth of this claim is challenging. Clearly, the connection between the concept ‘object’ and sortal concepts is that sortal concepts fill out a specific way for a bounded, coherent, three-dimensional object to behave, come to be, to be, to be qualified, and to pass away. That specific sortal concepts fill out specific ways for certain material objects to behave is a fact about the identity and persistence conditions they embody. Since grasping a sortal concept implies grasping a criterion of identity, we may say that grasping a sortal concept implies grasping some criterion of identity. We appear to be close to Wiggins’s explanation of the necessity of the concept ‘object’. It involves grasping some criterion of identity
and persistence and related notions, and this is implied by the grasping of particular sortal concepts. Strawson produces a similar argument who claims that the concept of identity, amongst a number of other concepts, is a formal concept (1966: 266). He claims that the 'concept of identity is applied in any straightforward statement of identity' (Ibid.). And that 'from any assertion to the effect that a certain individual has a certain property there follows an assertion of the existence of something having that property' (Ibid.). The parallels to Wiggins' argument are obvious.

Is the general claim true? In extensional contexts, if a designated entity $E$ instantiates a property $F$ in a given domain $D$ then it's true that some entity instantiates $F$ in $D$. More restrictedly, if a designated entity $E$ instantiates a sortal property $S$ in a given domain $D$ then it's true that some entity instantiates $S$ in $D$. That we feel compelled to accept these conditionals is hard to explain other than by the appeal to the fact that both antecedents entail their consequents, and we can formally describe the entailment in predicate logic. Does this help us with assessing the claim that possession of the concept of a particular sortal implies possession of the concept 'object' or the concept of some kind of sortal? The implication here isn't extensional, since the connective 'S possesses the concept of …' is non-truth functional. Hence, it's logically possible that a subject possesses the concept of a particular kind of substance but doesn't possess the concept of some kind of sortal. Yet, although the claim is non-extensional, it is also very hard to deny. Since grasping a sortal concept implies grasping a particular criterion of identity, it is hard to suggest that this does not also imply grasping the indeterminate 'some criterion of
identity'. As such, it appears the concept 'object' is a genuinely formal concept whose possession is necessary for the possession of sortal concepts.
Chapter 4

This chapter will discuss transcendental realism and transcendental idealism in relation to concept-directed transcendental arguments.\(^8\) A discussion of realism and idealism in any piece on transcendental arguments tends to be customary. It is often alleged that transcendental arguments are committed to idealism for various reasons. The falsity of this allegation is satisfactorily shown elsewhere.\(^9\) Instead, this chapter will focus on determining the difference between realism and idealism, and it will be contested that it is less significant than often argued. Additionally, it will be argued that the foregoing concept-directed transcendental arguments considered do not obviously commit one to idealism or realism.\(^10\)

Kant describes idealism as the thesis that ‘objects must conform to our knowledge’ and realism as the thesis that ‘all our knowledge must conform to objects’ (Bxvi). These claims become less opaque if we spell out the reference of ‘our knowledge’. Kant is referring to the cognitive capacities or faculties whose participation and cooperation in experience is necessary for knowledge. These capacities are the sensibility and the understanding. Through ‘the first [i.e., the sensibility] which objects are given to us, but through the second [i.e., the understanding] of which they are thought’ (A15/B29). The sensibility is our receptive capacity for receiving objects and the understanding is our spontaneous or

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\(^8\) Henceforth, unless otherwise specified, ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ will refer to ‘transcendental realism’ and ‘transcendental idealism’ respectively.

\(^9\) Cf. Cassam (1999)

\(^10\) That’s not to say that the assumption of idealism or realism has no bearing on any concept-directed transcendental argument; for example, it has a clear bearing on the *Deduction*. 
active capacity for judging about objects. Neither the idealist nor the realist can deny that we have a sensibility and an understanding. Since objects appear to us we must have a capacity to receive objects; this capacity is just what Kant calls the 'sensibility'. Likewise, since we can judge or think about objects we must have a capacity to do so; this capacity is just what Kant calls the 'understanding'. Given this, the difference between idealism and realism can be re-expressed this way: idealism is the thesis that 'objects must conform to our sensibility and our understanding' and realism is the thesis that 'our sensibility and our understanding must conform to objects'.

But, what does it mean to say that objects must conform to our sensibility and understanding or that our sensibility and understanding must conform to objects? Let's attempt to explain these claims in written order. The reference of 'objects' for Kant is 'things in themselves'. Things in themselves are mind-independent objects that 'cannot be known' (A29). If things in themselves must conform to our sensibility and understanding, then they can only appear to us under the conditions by which our sensibility and understanding can represent them. Hence, Kant's claim that it is certain faculties 'of the mind' which 'contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience' (A94). Since the idealist's conditions for experience are alleged to lie in his sensibility and understanding, they will be called 'subjective

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11 Although some may deny that their mutual cooperation is necessary for experience. Usually this is denied on the assumption that the 'experience' involved is not obviously conceptual, as with infant experience.
conditions'.\textsuperscript{12} The forms of our sensibility and understanding are the conditions under which we can experience objects. The \textit{Aesthetic} argues that the forms of our sensibility are space and time and the \textit{Deduction} argues that the forms of our understanding are the pure concepts. So, things in themselves can only appear insofar as they are represented spatiotemporally and represented by means of the pure concepts. In respect of space and time, this means that 'time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves' (A369). The cognitive upshot of this is that experience of the world is experience of the world of appearances, not the world of things in themselves.\textsuperscript{13}

The realist, on the other hand, thinks that our sensibility and understanding conform to objects. At a general level, this means that the conditions of knowledge are 'grounded...in the nature of objects as they are in themselves' (Cassam 1999: 103). Strawson explains the position as being one in which 'in aiming at knowledge we should aim at making our beliefs and judgements conform as closely as possible to the way things are in reality: knowledge must be subject to its objects,

\textsuperscript{12} Kant also includes the imagination at A94 as a faculty which contains a condition of the possibility of experience. Yet, he says at B153 that the imagination is 'the understanding, under the title of a \textit{transcendental synthesis of imagination}'. Unrelatedly, for technical correctness we should talk about conditions for the \textit{possibility} of experience as being subjective for the idealist, since it's a condition for experience for the idealist that things in themselves exist and this would presumably be an objective condition.

\textsuperscript{13} There's a dispute as to whether the two worlds are ontologically distinct or, in fact, that they are the same world viewed from different perspectives. Anthony Savile describes the former 'two world' view as being the view that there are two 'worlds which are quite unconnected with one another, one of which is shot through with spatio-temporality, and the other of which rigorously excludes it' (2005: 27). The latter view is the 'one world' view, which is the view that the world as it appears to us 'is spatiotemporal in nature, whereas considered in itself it is not. Here there is only one world, thought about in these different ways from different points of view' (Savile 2005: 27). This interpretative difficulty only makes the task of spelling out the difference between realism and idealism far harder. We will attempt to spell it out independent of one world and two world considerations.
epistemology to metaphysics’ (1992b: 12). Insofar as the realist’s conditions supposedly arise in virtue of the nature of objects themselves, her conditions will be called ‘objective conditions’. We can get a better handle on the notion of objective conditions for experience if we briefly consider a transcendental argument that begins from an assumption about the nature of objects themselves.\textsuperscript{14} The argument goes like this. Empirical knowledge of an object implies an intuition of it that is conceptualised. Objects themselves are spatiotemporal. Therefore, empirical knowledge of an object implies a spatiotemporal intuition of it that is conceptualised as spatiotemporal. Consequently, spatiotemporal intuition is a ‘uniquely fundamental and necessary condition of any empirical knowledge of objects’ (Strawson 1997: 240) and we must conceptualise objects as persistent space-occupiers. This, in turn, implies that we have the possession of a ‘space-occupying persistent object’ and we might be said to have at least a faint analogue of Kant’s schematised category of substance’ (Strawson 1966: 83). If the argument is successful it succeeds in showing that space and time are the forms of our sensibility and the concept of a persistent space-occupier is the form of our understanding. The argument is deeply flawed for a number of reasons, which is why it wasn’t included as one of the concept-directed transcendental arguments considered. Yet, it remains illustrative of the notion of an objective condition. The argument purports to show that because of a property of objects themselves, we must intuit and conceptualise objects specific ways in order to have knowledge of them.

\textsuperscript{14} Versions of these arguments are found in Cassam (1999) and Strawson (1997).
The suggested difference between realism and idealism is that the realist's conditions for experience are objective and the idealist's conditions for experience are subjective. It appears that we can make some sense of this difference. Yet, it will be argued that the difference becomes more opaque on deeper reflection. This becomes apparent if we consider Paul Guyer's attempt at eliciting a further distinction between realist and idealist conditions for experience. He comments that realist conditions 'reflect the structure of both the epistemic subject and the object of knowledge' whilst idealist conditions reflect 'the former instead of the latter' (1987: 340). Given what has been said, the description of realist conditions appears correct, but that of idealist conditions appears incorrect. The realist transcendental argument just offered claimed that because objects are spatiotemporal having empirical knowledge of them implies having a spatiotemporal intuition of them and conceptualising them as spatiotemporal. Clearly, the alleged necessary conditions of empirical knowledge reflect the object of knowledge, which is spatiotemporal. They also reflect the epistemic subject, for they imply that she must intuit and conceptualise the object of knowledge in certain specific ways. Guyer seems to be right that realist conditions reflect the subject and the object. Yet the claim that idealist conditions reflect the subject and not the object of knowledge is false. For example, the conclusion of the Aesthetic, in respect of space, is that space is transcendentally ideal and empirically real. Kant says that its empirical reality consists in its 'objective validity...in respect of whatever can be presented to us outwardly as object' (A28/B44). As we suggested earlier, this is purported to have
been shown because space is a form of our sensibility, and so a subjective condition for experience. But as a subjective condition for experience, anything that can be presented to us in experience must be presented spatially. Since the ‘object of knowledge’ is the object of experience, then the idealist’s condition for experience reflects the subject and the object too.

If idealist and realist conditions reflect the subject and the object, then we may wonder how it can be claimed that idealist conditions are subjective and realist conditions are objective, for it seems that in some sense they are both subjective and objective. Consider the following. If an idealist claims that $F$ is a form of our sensibility and so any object of empirical knowledge must be represented as $F$, then it’s a necessary condition for anything’s being an object of empirical knowledge that it be represented as $F$. The idealist condition now appears to be objective. Likewise, if a realist claims that $F$ is a property of objects, then any empirical knowledge of objects implies that the subject intuit them as $F$ and so $F$ is necessarily a form of our sensibility. The realist condition now appears to be subjective. We may try to explain the difference between the idealist and realist condition as consisting in the fact that the idealist’s conditions for experience arise in virtue of the subject’s faculties themselves and the realist’s conditions for experience arise in virtue of properties of objects themselves. Perhaps there’s some truth to this explanation. But, it’s too opaque to make much sense of.

This doesn’t mean that the distinction between idealism and realism is insignificant. If the ‘two world’ interpretation of Kant’s idealism is correct, then the
world of things in themselves is a non-spaciotemporal world that is ontologically distinct to the spaciotemporal world of appearances. Given that the realist would flatly deny that this is the case, then a lot can turn on whether (two world) idealism or realism is the case.

However, to the extent that the transcendental arguments considered here concern concepts, such as the possession of sortal concepts and the possession of the concept ‘object, much less turns on whether idealism or realism is the case. If the arguments considered are sound, then the only consequence is that there are certain concepts whose possession is necessary for a significant feature of our mental lives. Unlike Kant’s pure concepts, which are rules of synthesis, the concepts considered here only enable a capacity to think about objects or a capacity to possess sortal concepts.
Concluding Remarks

This thesis has argued that concept-directed transcendental arguments are a prima facie viable form of argument that is not subject to the traditional problems that beset transcendental arguments. It is also argued that sound concept-directed transcendental arguments are anti-conventionalist. The middle two chapters considered certain specific concept-directed transcendental arguments. It is argued that a good case can be made for the necessity of the possession of sortal concepts for thought about objects and for the necessity of the possession of the concept ‘object’ for the possession of sortal concepts. It is not obvious whether these particular concept-directed transcendental arguments are representative of concept-directed transcendental arguments as a type. However, it is not obvious that these arguments are not representative of the type either. In the last chapter, an overview of idealism and realism was presented and it was argued that the difference between these positions is less so than commonly argued. Further, it was argued that the concept-directed transcendental arguments considered are not committed to idealism or realism.
Bibliography


