Wu, W; Pierazzi, F; Du, Y; Brandão, M; (2024) Characterizing Physical Adversarial Attacks on Robot Motion Planners. In: Proceedings - IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation. (pp. pp. 14319-14325). IEEE: Yokohama, Japan.

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Abstract

As the adoption of robots across society increases, so does the importance of considering cybersecurity issues such as vulnerability to adversarial attacks. In this paper we investigate the vulnerability of an important component of autonomous robots to adversarial attacks - robot motion planning algorithms. We particularly focus on attacks on the physical environment, and propose the first such attacks to motion planners: 'planner failure' and 'blindspot' attacks. Planner failure attacks make changes to the physical environment so as to make planners fail to find a solution. Blindspot attacks exploit occlusions and sensor field-of-view to make planners return a trajectory which is thought to be collision-free, but is actually in collision with unperceived parts of the environment. Our experimental results show that successful attacks need only to make subtle changes to the real world, in order to obtain a drastic increase in failure rates and collision rates - leading the planner to fail 95% of the time and collide 90% of the time in problems generated with an existing planner benchmark tool. We also analyze the transferability of attacks to different planners, and discuss underlying assumptions and future research directions. Overall, the paper shows that physical adversarial attacks on motion planning algorithms pose a serious threat to robotics, which should be taken into account in future research and development.

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