Kürbis, Nils;
(2023)
On a Definition of Logical Consequence.
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
10.5840/tht20233612.
(In press).
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Abstract
Bilateralists, who accept that there are two primitive speech acts, assertion and denial, can offer an attractive definition of consequence: Y follows from X if and only if it is incoherent to assert all formulas X and to deny all formulas Y. The present paper argues that this definition has consequences many will find problematic, amongst them that truth coincides with assertibility. Philosophers who reject these consequences should therefore reject this definition of consequence.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | On a Definition of Logical Consequence |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.5840/tht20233612 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.5840/tht20233612 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | © The Thought Trust. This Open Access article is distributed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). |
| Keywords: | logical consequence, assertion, denial, bilateralism |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10166597 |
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