Che, Y-K;
Kim, K;
Mierendorff, K;
(2020)
Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion.
ArXiv: Ithaca, NY, USA.
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Abstract
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)'s sender-optimal persuasion as well as full revelation and everything in between are obtained in MPE, as the cost vanishes.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.07338v3 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10094222 |
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