Griffith, R;
Neely, A;
(2006)
Incentives and managerial experience in multi-taskteams: evidence from within a firm.
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, UCL (University College London), The Institute for Fiscal Studies
Preview |
PDF
2658.pdf Download (277kB) |
Abstract
This paper exploits a quasi-experimental setting to estimate the impact thata multi-dimensional group incentive scheme had on branch performance in a largedistribution firm. The scheme, which is based on the Balanced Scorecard, wasimplemented in all branches in one division, but not in another. Branches from thesecond division are used as a control group. Our results suggest that the balancedscorecard had some impact, but that it varied with branch characteristics, and inparticular, branches with more experienced managers were better able to respond tothe new incentives. This paper exploits a quasi-experimental setting to estimate the impact thata multi-dimensional group incentive scheme had on branch performance in a largedistribution firm. The scheme, which is based on the Balanced Scorecard, wasimplemented in all branches in one division, but not in another. Branches from thesecond division are used as a control group. Our results suggest that the balancedscorecard had some impact, but that it varied with branch characteristics, and inparticular, branches with more experienced managers were better able to respond tothe new incentives.
Type: | Report |
---|---|
Title: | Incentives and managerial experience in multi-taskteams: evidence from within a firm |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
Additional information: | Imported via OAI, 7:29:01 3rd Mar 2007; Imported via OAI, 7:29:01 16th May 2007 |
UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/2658 |
Archive Staff Only
View Item |