Legros, P;
Newman, A;
(2002)
Assortative matching in a non-transferable world.
(Discussion Papers in Economics
02-04
).
Department of Economics, University College London, UCL (University College London), Department of Economics, University College: London, UK.
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Abstract
Progress in the application of matching models to environments inwhich the utility between matching partners is not fully transferablehas been hindered by a lack of characterization results analogous tothose that are known for transferable utility. We present sufficientconditions for matching to be monotone that are simple to expressand easy to verify. We illustrate their application with some examplesthat are of independent interest. Progress in the application of matching models to environments inwhich the utility between matching partners is not fully transferablehas been hindered by a lack of characterization results analogous tothose that are known for transferable utility. We present sufficientconditions for matching to be monotone that are simple to expressand easy to verify. We illustrate their application with some examplesthat are of independent interest.
| Type: | Report |
|---|---|
| Title: | Assortative matching in a non-transferable world |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Additional information: | Imported via OAI, 20:31:45 23rd Feb 2007 |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/2574 |
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