Albano, G.L.;
Leaver, C.;
(2004)
Transparency, recruitment and retention in the public sector.
(Discussion Papers in Economics
04-05).
Department of Economics, University College London: London, UK.
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Abstract
This paper evaluates the impact of releasing performance measures on public sector recruitment and retention. We analyse the role played by the informativeness of disclosure by comparing a policy of transparency with confidentiality, and the role played by the timing of disclosure via a comparison with delayed (e.g. end of project) reporting. We show that relative wage compression in the public sector produces a recruitment-retention trade-off. Transparency minimises the cost of recruitment, delayed reporting minimises the cost of short-term retention, while confidentiality minimises the cost of long-term retention. The optimal disclosure policy varies with the type of public organisation - that is, with the relative value of public sector projects and the complexity of production - warning against the current ’one size fits all’ policy
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Transparency, recruitment and retention in the public sector |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://www.ucl.ac.uk/silva/economics/research/pape... |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Please also see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/14567 for a related item |
| Keywords: | JEL classification: D82, D73, H1, J31, J44, J45. Recruitment and retention, wage compression, optimal disclosure policies |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/2573 |
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