Aghion, P.;
Tirole, J.;
(1994)
The management of innovation.
Quarterly Journal of Economics
, 109
(4)
pp. 1181-1209.
![[thumbnail of 17669.pdf]](https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) Preview |
PDF
17669.pdf Download (2MB) |
Abstract
The paper analyzes the organization of the R&D activity in an incomplete contract framework. It provides theoretical foundations: (a) to understand how the allocation of property rights on innovations may affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations; (b) to rationalize commonly observed features in research employment contracts, such as shop rights, trailer clauses, and the "hired for" doctrine; (c) to discuss the robustness of the so-called Schumpeterian hypotheses to endogenizing the organization of R&D; and (d) to provide a rationale for cofinancing arrangements in research activities.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | The management of innovation |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/qjec |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | © 1994 The MIT Press |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/17669 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
