Cripps, M.W.;
Thomas, J.;
(1997)
Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games.
Games and Economic Behavior
, 18
(2)
pp. 141-158.
10.1006/game.1997.0520.
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Abstract
We consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one-sided incomplete information: one player (the informed player) might be a commitment type playing the Pareto dominant action. As discounting, which is assumed to be symmetric, and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero, it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even when perfection is imposed on the equilibrium.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1006/game.1997.0520 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0520 |
| Language: | English |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/16385 |
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