Cripps, M.W.;
Ireland, N.;
(2001)
Optimal complementary auctions.
Bulletin of Economic Research
, 53
(2)
pp. 81-100.
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Abstract
This paper considers the situation where two products are sold by the same seller, but to disjoint sets of potential buyers. Externalities may arise from each market outcome to the other. The paper examines the nature of the seller's optimal mechanism, and, for example in the case of positive externalities, it is shown that the allocation decision in either market depends on the highest types in both markets. The optimal mechanism can be implemented by an indirect mechanism that essentially charges winning bidders for the value of their externalities. The analysis is applied to the sale of public sector franchises including exploration and development rights for oil and gas tracts.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Optimal complementary auctions |
| Identifier: | 10.1111/1467-8586.00120 |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8586.00120 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/16383 |
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