Oliveros, V;
Schuster, C;
(2017)
Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence From a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic.
Comparative Political Studies
10.1177/0010414017710268.
(In press).
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Abstract
Bureaucratic behavior in developing countries remains poorly understood. Why do some public servants – yet not others – work hard to deliver public services, misuse state resources, and/or participate in electoral mobilization? A classic answer comes from Weber: bureaucratic structures shift behavior towards integrity, neutrality, and commitment to public service. Our paper conducts the first survey experimental test of the effects of bureaucratic structures. It does so through a conjoint experiment with public servants in the Dominican Republic. Looking at merit examinations and job stability, we find that Weber was right – but only partially. Recruitment by examination curbs corruption and political services by bureaucrats, while enhancing work motivation. Job stability, by contrast, only decreases political services: tenured bureaucrats are less likely to participate in electoral mobilization. Examinations thus enhance the quality of bureaucracy (motivation and lower corruption) and democracy (electoral competition); job stability only enhances the quality of democracy.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence From a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1177/0010414017710268 |
| Publisher version: | http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017710268 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | Bureaucracy; Merit; Patronage; Tenure; Conjoint Experiment; Weber |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Political Science |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1566859 |
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