Shaw, AN;
(2017)
The Transparency of Belief.
Masters thesis , UCL (University College London).
Abstract
Do you believe that there will be a third world war? It appears that you are able to come to know your beliefs on this matter in a way that does not depend on observing your own behaviour. A further peculiarity is evident; seemingly, you can answer the question of whether you believe the proposition that there will be a third world war simply by asking yourself the question of whether there will be a third world war. It is puzzling that one can answer a self-directed question concerning one's own beliefs about whether P by answering a different world-directed question about whether P. This phenomenon has come to be known as the transparency of belief. How is it possible to acquire knowledge about one's judgements and beliefs in this way? I develop the view that a conscious judgement that P constitutes an accessible reason to self-ascribe both the judgement that P and the corresponding belief that P. Building on the work of Peacocke (1999), I explain how such an account can vindicate a form of self-knowledge that satisfies robust internalist intuitions about the justificatory status of transparently acquired self-knowledge.
| Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
|---|---|
| Title: | The Transparency of Belief |
| Event: | UCL |
| Language: | English |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1565465 |
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