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Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game

Danz, D; Huck, S; Jehiel, P; (2016) Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game. German Economic Review , 17 (3) pp. 359-377. 10.1111/geer.12098. Green open access

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Abstract

We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they make use of this information even if it is less precise than their own private statistics – except for very high stakes. Making public information more precise has two consequences: It is also used when the stakes are very high and it reduces the number of subjects who ignore any information – public and private. That is, precise public information crowds in the use of own information. Finally, our results shed some light on unraveling in centipede games.

Type: Article
Title: Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1111/geer.12098
Publisher version: http://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12098
Language: English
Additional information: © 2016 German Economic Association (Verein fur Socialpolitik). This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Danz, D; Huck, S; Jehiel, P; (2016) Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game. German Economic Review , 17 (3) pp. 359-377. 10.1111/geer.12098, which has been published in final form at http://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12098. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
Keywords: Social Sciences, Economics, Business & Economics, Backward induction, analogy-based expectation equilibrium, learning, experiment, CENTIPEDE GAME, PERFECT INFORMATION, EQUILIBRIUM
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1518989
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