Danz, D;
Huck, S;
Jehiel, P;
(2016)
Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game.
German Economic Review
, 17
(3)
pp. 359-377.
10.1111/geer.12098.
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Abstract
We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they make use of this information even if it is less precise than their own private statistics – except for very high stakes. Making public information more precise has two consequences: It is also used when the stakes are very high and it reduces the number of subjects who ignore any information – public and private. That is, precise public information crowds in the use of own information. Finally, our results shed some light on unraveling in centipede games.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/geer.12098 |
| Publisher version: | http://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12098 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | © 2016 German Economic Association (Verein fur Socialpolitik). This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Danz, D; Huck, S; Jehiel, P; (2016) Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game. German Economic Review , 17 (3) pp. 359-377. 10.1111/geer.12098, which has been published in final form at http://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12098. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. |
| Keywords: | Social Sciences, Economics, Business & Economics, Backward induction, analogy-based expectation equilibrium, learning, experiment, CENTIPEDE GAME, PERFECT INFORMATION, EQUILIBRIUM |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1518989 |
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