O'Brien, L; (2010) Mental Actions and the No-Content Problem. In: O'Brien, Lucy and Soteriou, Matthew, (eds.) Mental Actions. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.

Preview

Text O'Brien_acprof-9780199225989-chapter-11.pdf Download (781kB) | Preview

Abstract

This chapter argues that a certain kind of object-dependent externalism can be shown to be problematic when we focus on the role of mental action in our thinking. The mental action the chapter focuses on is supposition. The problem raised for this kind of externalism is to explain what is going on when an attempt to make a supposition with a demonstrative content fails, due to the fact that there is no relevant object available to be demonstratively referred to, and hence no content to suppose. The chapter considers a number of responses to this problem the object-dependent externalist might offer, and argues that all are, in one way or another, inadequate. In particular, they fail to provide an adequate answer to the ontological question: what is going on in the mental life of the subject when this kind of failure of self-knowledge takes place?

Download activity - last month

Export as JSONXMLCSV

Download activity - last 12 months

Export as XMLCSVJSON

Downloads by country - last 12 months

Export as JSONXMLCSV

Archive Staff Only

View Item