Guillot, MV; (2016) Thinking of oneself as the thinker: The concept of self and the phenomenology of intellection. Philosophical Explorations , 19 (2) pp. 138-160. 10.1080/13869795.2016.1176232.

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Abstract

The indexical word “I” has traditionally been assumed to be an overt analogue to the concept of self, and the best model for understanding it. This approach, I argue, overlooks the essential role of cognitive phenomenology in the mastery of the concept of self. I suggest that a better model is to be found in a different kind of representation: phenomenal concepts, or more generally phenomenally-grounded concepts. I start with what I take to be the defining feature of the concept of self, namely its “super-reflexivity”: to use this concept isn’t just to think of oneself, but to think of oneself as the thinker of the present thought. I call this familiar observation the “Thinker Intuition”. I review some shortcomings of the indexical model of the concept of self, which is the classical account of the Thinker Intuition. I go on to propose a different account, the “phenomenal model”, according to which the concept of self is a phenomenally-grounded concept, anchored in a generic kind of cognitive phenomenology: the phenomenology of intellection.

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