Martin, Michael GF; (2015) Moore's Dilemma. In: Coates, P and Coleman, S, (eds.) Phenomenal qualities: Sensation, perception, and consciousness. (p. 147). Oxford University Press: Oxford, United Kingdom.

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Abstract

In 1918 GE Moore questioned the assumptions behind traditional sense-datum theories and offered the Multiple Relational Theory of Appearing, which he said could not be ruled out as a possible alternative. In 1953, Moore eventually came to reject the alternative and recommend endorsement of the traditional sense-datum theory again. This paper explores what Moore’s reservations in 1918 were, what the correct interpretation of the Multiple Relation Theory should be, and why it made sense for him ultimately to reject it. Moore’s paper throws light both on the nature of the argument from illusion as used in the sense-datum tradition, but also as it has been appealed to in more recent discussions of intentional theories of perception.

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