Billon, A;
Guillot, MV;
(2014)
Can Fregeans have 'I'-thoughts?
Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica
, 53
(136)
pp. 97-105.
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Abstract
We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let alone a priori true. This further reinforces Glezakos’s objections against the set-up of Frege’s puzzle, while also raising what we think is an acute problem for Fregeans, insofar as I-thought (and indexical thinking more generally), understood in their way, turns out to be incompatible with some basic features of rationality.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | Can Fregeans have 'I'-thoughts? |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
Publisher version: | http://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/arti... |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | This is an Open Access article published under the terms of the Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 Costa Rica Licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/cr/). |
Keywords: | I-thoughts, Token-reflexivity, One-shot thoughts, Paradox, Rationality |
UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1476638 |




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