Hicks, TM; Jacobs, AM; Matthews, JS; (2016) Inequality and Electoral Accountability: Class-Biased Economic Voting in Comparative Perspective. Journal of Politics , 78 (4) pp. 1076-1093. 10.1086/686157.

Preview	Text (Published version of record) Hicks_Inequality_Electoral_Accountability_VoR.pdf - Published Version Download (1MB) | Preview
Preview	Text (Supplementary material) CBEVComparative_suppl_20160127.pdf - Accepted Version Download (443kB) | Preview

Abstract

Do electorates hold governments accountable for the distribution of economic welfare? Building on the finding of “class-biased economic voting” in the United States, we exam- ine how OECD electorates respond to alternative distributions of income gains and losses. Drawing on individual-level electoral data and aggregate election results across 15 advanced democracies, we examine whether lower- and middle-income voters defend their distributive interests by punishing governments for concentrating income gains among the rich. We find no indication that non-rich voters punish rising inequality, and substantial evidence that electorates positively reward the concentration of aggregate income growth at the top. Our results suggest that governments commonly face political incentives systematically skewed in favor of inegalitarian economic outcomes. At the same time, we find that the electorate’s tolerance of rising inequality has its limits: class biases in economic voting diminish as the income shares of the rich grow in magnitude.

Download activity - last month

Export as JSONCSVXML

Download activity - last 12 months

Export as JSONCSVXML

Downloads by country - last 12 months

Export as JSONCSVXML

Archive Staff Only

View Item