

Supplementary Material for:
Inequality and Electoral Accountability:
Class-Biased Economic Voting in Comparative Perspective

Timothy Hicks

University College London

`t.hicks@ucl.ac.uk`

Alan M. Jacobs

University of British Columbia

`alan.jacobs@ubc.ca`

J. Scott Matthews

Memorial University of Newfoundland

`scott.matthews@mun.ca`

January 27, 2016

Contents

Page

1	Data Sources and Variable Construction	2
1.1	Data for Individual-Level Analyses (National Election Studies)	2
1.1.1	Non-income variable descriptions	2
1.1.2	Details of national election studies	2
1.1.3	Income measures	4
1.1.4	Estimating Income Levels From Swedish Income Distribution Data	13
1.2	Aggregate-Level TSCS Analyses: Data	14
2	The Specification of Our Empirical Models	16
2.1	Modelling Response to Inequality	16
2.2	Controlling for Party Identification	18
3	Moderation of Individual-Level Results by Top-Income Shares	23
4	Robustness Tests: Individual-Level Analyses	26
4.1	The U.S.	26
4.2	Sweden	28
4.3	The U.K.	31
4.4	Canada	32
5	Robustness Tests: Aggregate-level TSCS Analyses	35

1 Data Sources and Variable Construction

In this section, we provide additional information on our data sources and the construction of variables.

1.1 Data for Individual-Level Analyses (National Election Studies)

1.1.1 Non-income variable descriptions

In Table 1, we provide descriptions for the non-income variables used in the national-election-study analyses.

Table 1: Descriptions of non-income variables used in the various national election study analyses.

Variable Label	Description	Source
$VoteIncumbent_{i,e}$	Binary variable coded to 1 for a respondent indicating they voted for the party of the incumbent prime minister, and 0 otherwise.	Various election surveys.
$ProPartyID_{i,e}$	7-point scale (from -1 to 1) for the U.S. and a binary variable for the other countries coded to 1 for a respondent indicating they identify most closely with the party of the incumbent prime minister, and 0 otherwise.	Various election surveys.
$Tenure_{i,e}$	Years the party of the incumbent prime minister has held the post.	Calculated from Döring and Manow (2012).

1.1.2 Details of national election studies

United States

For the U.S. we use the American National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative Data File, which combines data from every study in that time series. The file includes all variables repeated and measured reasonably consistently over the years. The ANES time series studies are based on face-to-face interviews with national probability samples, although some years include over-

samples of particular demographic groups. Where necessary, we account for these design-based departures from random sampling using sampling weights provided in the data file. Each election sample is reweighted so that all years are weighted equally, in total.

Canada

Our survey data for Canada largely derive from a data file, prepared by Richard Johnston at the University of British Columbia, that contains data for selected variables from the Canadian Election Studies (CES) from 1965 to 2011. This file excludes the 1972 study, which we have added to the file ourselves. (An excerpt of Johnston’s file containing only those variables used in the paper, and supplemented with data for 1972, can be obtained from the Dataverse page for this paper.) Canadian election surveys were generally face-to-face prior to 1988, whereupon the primary survey mode switched to telephone interviewing. Whenever possible, we rely on face-to-face interviews conducted immediately following Election Day. Each survey was fielded to a national probability sample, but excluded the Yukon, the North West Territories and Nunavut. For most years, the samples are unique cross-sections of respondents. At times, however, we must rely partly or entirely on members of multi-election panels (e.g., the 1974-1979-1980 panel). In general, these panels have been “topped up” at each successive wave of interviews with fresh respondents, in order to render the samples representative of their respective electorates. Where necessary, we account for design-based departures from random sampling – owing, for instance, to oversampling of certain demographic groups in some surveys – through the use of sampling weights supplied by study investigators. Each election sample is reweighted so that all years are weighted equally, in total.

Sweden

Data from the Swedish Election Study were obtained from the Swedish National Data Service. The Swedish election-study data are based on face-to-face surveys throughout the sample period and, whenever possible, we rely on interviews conducted immediately following Election Day. Each survey was fielded to a national probability sample. Since 1973, the Swedish surveys have been designed as “rolling two-stage panels,” whereby one-half of the sample at a given election is

a fresh cross-section to be interviewed in the present and in the subsequent election, and one-half of the sample are members of a panel initiated at the previous election. For the analyses in the present paper, we exclude all panelists’ second-wave interviews. Design weights are not available, so we simply reweight each election sample so that all years are weighted equally, in total.

UK

Data from the British Election Study were obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan and, for more recent years, from the British Election Study. The British election-study data are based on face-to-face surveys throughout the sample period. Whenever possible, we rely on interviews conducted immediately following Election Day. Each survey was fielded to a national probability sample, but the studies generally exclude Northern Ireland.¹ For most years, the samples are unique cross-sections of respondents, although we must rely on members of a multi-election panel for the 1963–1964–1966 election sequence. These panels were “topped up” at each successive wave of interviews with fresh respondents, in order to render the samples representative of their respective electorates. The 1964 and 1966 BES samples include sampling weights designed to correct for panel attrition and mortality, which we utilize in our analyses. More generally, we account for design-based departures from random sampling — owing, for instance, to oversampling of certain demographic groups in some surveys — through the use of sampling weights supplied by study investigators. Each election sample is reweighted so that all years are weighted equally, in total.

1.1.3 Income measures

In Table 2, we detail how we measure mean, top, lower, and middle-income growth rates in the analyses reported in the main text, indicating the precise income concepts and statistics used. Data sources are documented in the table’s footnotes. The statistics correspond to notations defined in Table 2 in the main text.

¹Separate Northern Irish studies have been conducted in some years.

Table 2: **Income measures and data sources.** Table refers to election-study, individual-level analyses reported in main text. All income measures exclude capital gains, with the exception of data drawn from Sweden Yearbooks, for which the source documentation does not explicitly state that capital gains have been excluded.

Measure		U.S.	Sweden	U.K. ²	Canada
Top-income	Concept	Total family income. ³	<u>1968–1979:</u> Total pre-tax income (earners). ⁴	Disposable income (households).	<u>1965–1982:</u> Pre-tax market income (adult individuals). ⁶
	Statistic	T5M	<u>1982–2010:</u> Disposable income (households). ⁵		<u>1983–2011:</u> After-tax income (individual tax-filers). ⁷
Mean-income	Concept	Total family income. ⁸	<u>1968–1979:</u> Total pre-tax income (earners). ⁹	Disposable income (households).	<u>1965–1976:</u> Pre-tax market income (tax units). ¹¹
	Statistic	T5M	<u>1982–2010:</u> Disposable income (households). ¹⁰		<u>1977–2011:</u> After-tax income (all family units). ¹²
Middle-income	Concept	Total family income. ¹³	<u>1968–1979:</u> Total pre-tax income (earners). ¹⁴	Disposable income (households).	<u>1977–2011:</u> After-tax income (all family units). ¹⁶
	Statistic	Q3M	<u>1982–2010:</u> Disposable income (households). ¹⁵		(Secondary specifications limited to 1977–2011.)
Bottom-income	Concept	Total family income. ¹⁷	<u>1968–1979:</u> Total pre-tax income (earners). ¹⁸	Disposable income (households).	<u>1977–2011:</u> After-tax income (all family units). ²⁰
	Statistic	Q1–2M	<u>1982–2010:</u> Disposable income (households). ¹⁹		(Secondary specifications limited to 1977–2011 elections.)
	Statistic	Q1–2M	<u>1968–1979:</u> P20.	P20	<u>1977–2011:</u> Q1–2M.
			<u>1982–2010:</u> Q1–2M.		

²All UK income data come from: Cribb et al. (2013). Income Before Housing Costs sheet.

³Drawn from Census Historical Income Table F-3. Mean Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Families (All Races), 2014 dollars series, <https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/families/2014/f03AR.xls>.

⁴Thresholds interpolated as described in Section 1.1.4. Data drawn from annual editions of Statistiska centralbyrån(SCB), Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm: SCB. In each volume, we have used the table titled “Inkomsttagare och summa inkomster efter inkomstklass” (“Income Earners and Total Income by Size of Income”), column “Number of income earners: Total.” Nominal income values deflated by CPI found at http://www.scb.se/en_/Finding-statistics/Statistics-by-subject-area/Prices-and-Consumption/Consumer-Price-Index/Consumer-Price-Index-CPI/Aktuell-Pong/33779/Consumer-Price-Index-CPI/33895/.

⁵Data from Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB) dataset, 2013-07-17, “Disposable Income, 1975-2011 [Sweden] [2013]”, [http://hdl.handle.net/11272/ZCRIM V1 \[Version\]](http://hdl.handle.net/11272/ZCRIM V1 [Version]). We use Excel file, “Disposable Income by deciles, 1975–2011,” sheet “Fixed prices.”

⁶WTID, Canada, “Top 5% Average Income” Series.

⁷Statistics Canada. Table 204-0001 — High income trends of tax filers in Canada, provinces, territories and census metropolitan areas (CMA), national thresholds, annual (percent unless otherwise noted), CANSIM (database), <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=2040001>. Current dollar values deflated, as recommended by Statscan, using All-items Consumer Price Index (CANSIM table 326-0021).

⁸We calculate this quantity by dividing line 1 (personal income) in the BEAs NIPA Table 2.1, “Personal Income and Its Disposition”, (<http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1#reqid=9&step=3&isuri=1&903=58>) by the number of families, as indicated in Census Historical Table F-1 (All Races) (<https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/families/2014/f01AR.xls>).

⁹Calculated from data in annual editions of Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB), Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm: SCB. In each volume, we have used the table titled “Inkomsttagare och summa inkomster efter inkomstklass” (“Income Earners and Total Income by Size of Income”). We calculate the mean income of all earners from the columns “Number of income earners: Total” and “Total income: Total.” Nominal income values deflated by CPI found at http://www.scb.se/en_/Finding-statistics/Statistics-by-subject-area/Prices-and-Consumption/Consumer-Price-Index/Consumer-Price-Index-CPI/Aktuell-Pong/33779/Consumer-Price-Index-CPI/33895/.

¹⁰Calculated as mean of decile means from Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB) dataset, 2013-07-17, “Disposable Income, 1975–2011 [Sweden] [2013]”, [http://hdl.handle.net/11272/ZCRIM V1 \[Version\]](http://hdl.handle.net/11272/ZCRIM V1 [Version]). We use Excel file, “Disposable Income by deciles, 1975–2011” sheet “Fixed prices.”

¹¹WTID, Canada, “Average Income per Tax Unit” Series.

¹²We have calculated the mean of the five quintile average incomes from Statistics Canada. Table 202-0701 — Market, total and after-tax income, by economic family type and income quintiles, 2011 constant dollars, annual, CANSIM (database), <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=2020701>.

¹³Drawn from Census Historical Income Table F-3. Mean Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Families (All Races), 2014 dollars series, <https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/families/2014/f03AR.xls>.

¹⁴Thresholds interpolated as described in Section 1.1.4. Data drawn from annual editions of Statistiska centralbyrån(SCB), Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm: SCB. In each volume, we have used the table titled “Inkomsttagare och summa inkomster efter inkomstklass” (“Income Earners and Total Income by Size of Income”), column “Number of income earners: Total.”

¹⁵Data from Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB) dataset, 2013-07-17, “Disposable Income, 1975–2011 [Sweden] [2013]”, [http://hdl.handle.net/11272/ZCRIM V1 \[Version\]](http://hdl.handle.net/11272/ZCRIM V1 [Version]). We use Excel file, “Disposable Income by deciles, 1975–2011” sheet “Fixed prices.”

¹⁶Statistics Canada. Table 202-0701 — Market, total and after-tax income, by economic family type and income quintiles, 2011 constant dollars, annual, CANSIM (database), <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng>

We have everywhere preferred measures of disposable or after-tax income over other income concepts. We have also sought to use income-group means, where possible, rather than quantile thresholds. We resort to alternative measures, however, where constrained by data availability or quality. We explain below deviations from these preferred measures.

U.S.

In the U.S., historical data on the incomes of income quantiles are available only for total (pre-tax) income. This is therefore the income concept that L. M. Bartels (2008) uses, and that we use as well. However, we depart from Bartels' measures in two ways.

First, Bartels measures mean income growth as mean disposable personal income. To bring the mean income measure into closer alignment with the quantile-income measures, we instead construct a measure of mean total family income, based on BEA measures of personal income and Census data on the number of families. Unlike Bartels, we thus use the same income concept – per-family total income – both for mean growth and for quantile growth (top 5%, Q1 and Q3).

Second, Bartels uses measures of growth in income *thresholds* as his measures of growth for the top 5% and in the quintiles. To better capture the distribution of income gains *between groups*, we instead use measures of growth in the *mean* income of the top 5% and of the *mean* income of bottom and middle quintiles. We lose four elections by making this switch, as the U.S. quantile-mean data series does not go back as far as the threshold series. Nevertheless, we see the gain in the fit between measure and concept as worth this loss, and the broad inferences do not meaningfully change, even with the reduced sample. We also show results based on threshold

eng&id=2020701.

¹⁷Drawn from Census Historical Income Table F-3. Mean Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Families (All Races), 2014 dollars series, <https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/families/2014/f03AR.xls>.

¹⁸Thresholds interpolated as described in Section 1.1.4. Data drawn from annual editions of Statistiska centralbyrån(SCB), Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm: SCB. In each volume, we have used the table titled “Inkomsttagare och summa inkomster efter inkomstklass” (“Income Earners and Total Income by Size of Income”), column “Number of income earners: Total.”

¹⁹Data from Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB) dataset, 2013-07-17, “Disposable Income, 1975–2011 [Sweden] [2013]”, http://hdl.handle.net/11272/ZCRIM_V1 [Version]. We use Excel file, “Disposable Income by deciles, 1975–2011” sheet “Fixed prices.”

²⁰Statistics Canada. *Table 202-0701 — Market, total and after-tax income, by economic family type and income quintiles, 2011 constant dollars, annual*, CANSIM (database), <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=2020701>.

measures below in the Supplementary Materials.

Canada

Income concept: We use after-tax income measures for Canada where available. As Statscan’s after-tax income series only goes back to 1983 (for top incomes) and 1977 (for mean and quintiles), we substitute WTID measures of top and mean pre-tax incomes for earlier years. In our secondary specifications (for low- and middle-income voters), we also limit the sample to the post-1977 period as we lack quintile-income measures for earlier years.

This implies a shift from pre-tax incomes for the earlier period (as the WTID measures are all pre-tax) to after-tax incomes for the later period. However, we show in Figures 1 and 2, below, that WTID measures of mean and top-5% pre-tax income growth line up well against Statscan’s after-tax measures where these two series overlap.

Further below in the Supplementary Material, we also show results for analyses that use only growth in after-tax incomes of the relevant income groups (which means limiting ourselves to the post-1982 period). As with the results reported in the main text, we observe only indifference to inequality, and not demand for inequality. Thus, the use of pre-tax data from the WTID does not appear to be affecting our inferences.

Thresholds vs. means: Throughout, we measure growth in the *mean* incomes of the relevant income groups.

United Kingdom

All British income measures are measures of disposable household income. The data come from the spreadsheet entitled “Inequality and Poverty Spreadsheet” that accompanies the Institute for Fiscal Studies report (Cribb et al., 2013). We focus on the “before housing costs” series for consistency with the other countries studied here. The underlying data for the spreadsheet are drawn from the government’s Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and the Family Resources Survey (FRS).

As no data are available for the mean incomes of British income groups, we are forced to measure growth in thresholds for bottom and middle quantiles and for the 95th percentile.

Figure 1: Canada: Mean income growth rates over time from alternative sources. Rates computed from WTID and Statistics Canada tables are closely aligned when they overlap.





Figure 2: Canada: Top income growth rates over time from alternative sources. Rates computed from WTID and Statistics Canada tables are closely aligned when they overlap.



Sweden

Income concept: The Swedish measures used in the main paper are measures of household disposable income from 1980 on (from Statistics Sweden).

Statistics Sweden’s measures of disposable income of income quantiles do not extend prior to 1980. Prior to the 1980s, we thus apply a linear-interpolation procedure, as described in Section 1.1.4 of the Supplementary Material, to data drawn from annual editions of Sweden Statistical Abstracts. These data refer to total taxable, before-tax incomes of earners, the only income-distribution measure available for this period.

Thresholds vs. means: For all income quantiles (the quintiles and the top-5%), pre-1980, we generally use the procedure described in Section 1.1.4 of the Supplementary Material to linearly interpolate income thresholds from Sweden Statistical Abstract distributional data.


For the post-1980 period, the income growth measures for quintiles are for growth in the mean incomes of the relevant quintiles, from Statistics Sweden.

Statistics Sweden also produces measures of the mean income of the top 5% for the post-1980 period. To better capture distributional dynamics between income groups, our preference would have been to use this series. However, these data appear to be extremely unreliable. Statistics Sweden reports margins of error for its income-distribution data, and indicates a very large MoE for the measure of the mean incomes of the top 5% – indeed, so large that it would swamp actual growth rates. We demonstrate the problem with plots of both the error estimates and the series itself (against alternative top-income-growth measures) in Figures 3 and 4; the extreme volatility of this measure is readily apparent. We suspect that the reason for the high volatility of this series is that it derives from a survey-based measure and is probably highly affected by fluctuations in the composition of the sample at the very top end of the income scale, where changes will disproportionately affect the mean.

In contrast, Statistics Sweden’s P95 threshold measure, also displayed in Figures 3 and 4, is much more stable and precise. This is unsurprising, given that a threshold measure will be less affected by survey-sampling variability at the very top (i.e., by the number of very rich

households sampled). Thus, for analyses in the main paper, for the post-1980 period, we use Statistics Sweden’s P95 measures, rather than their measures of the mean income of the top 5%.

Figure 3: Sweden: top income growth rates from various sources.



We also note some volatility in Statistics Sweden’s measure of aggregate mean after-tax income (see Figure 5). We thus wanted to be sure that noise in this measure was not biasing our results toward a CBEV effect (away from a standard mean-economic-voting effect). In Table 20 below, we show models using an alternative set of measures drawn from the WTID. The models displayed here use a measure of the mean (pre-tax) income of the top-5% for the entire period, drawn from the WTID’s Sweden series. As seen in Figure 3, the WTID mean-top-5% measure tracks the SCB’s P95 measure quite closely. The models in Table 20 also use WTID’s measure of aggregate mean-income, in lieu of Statistics Sweden’s measure. As can be seen, the basic inferences do not change significantly with the use of these WTID measures, with a quite clear demand-for-inequality emerging here as for the models in the main paper.

We also show in Table 21 of the Supplementary Material the model results when we use Statistics Sweden’s (very noisy) top-5%-mean measure. The demand-for-inequality disappears in these analyses.

Figure 4: Sweden: times series for the margin of error of P95 and T5M as a percentage of the respective income level.





Figure 5: Sweden: mean income growth rates from various sources.



1.1.4 Estimating Income Levels From Swedish Income Distribution Data

For earlier parts of our sample periods for Sweden, direct measures of income levels for the income quantiles of interest to us (i.e. the various quintiles and the 95th percentile) are not available. Therefore, for our income series for Sweden, we must combine data on annual income levels for the income quantiles of interest from two sources. Statistics Sweden (SCB) provides quintile and 95th percentile disposable income levels from 1975 onwards. For years prior to this, we use distributional data from *Sweden Statistical Abstracts* (see Income Sources table), and then estimate the income levels relevant to our analysis. These distributional data come in the form of income bands that indicate the upper and lower bounds of each band, as well as the percentage of the population that falls within each band.²¹

To calculate the income levels that are of interest to us, we use the following algorithm:

1. Find the income band that contains the income quantile we are interested in.
2. Calculate the proportion (p) of people in the band that, when added to all the people in the lower bands, would form the cut-off for our income quantile of interest.
3. Estimate the income level for the income quantile of interest as the lower-bound of the income band plus p times the difference between the upper and lower bounds of the income band.

We then deflate these nominal income levels, using Swedish CPI data, to obtain real income levels. As the SCB and our interpolated income series do not match perfectly in terms of underlying methodology, we first calculate the growth rates for the two income series, and then merge the two to yield variables that cover the period 1954–2010 — where preference is given to the *Statistics Sweden* data rather than our yearbook-derived data, when we have both available.

²¹In some cases, we must calculate the percentage from the raw numbers of people in each band.

1.2 Aggregate-Level TSCS Analyses: Data

Table 3 provides details on the sample used in the aggregate-level, TSCS (15-country) analyses presented in the paper.

Table 3: Summary, by country, of full sample used for estimating effects of mean- and top-income growth on incumbent-prime-ministerial-party vote share in aggregate-level TSCS analyses reported in paper.

Country	Election N	First Year	Last Year
Australia	29	1946	2010
Canada	19	1948	2010
Denmark	22	1950	2007
France	13	1950	2007
Germany	10	1965	1998
Italy	5	1975	1991
Japan	18	1948	2009
Netherlands	13	1951	1997
New Zealand	21	1949	2008
Norway	13	1953	2005
Portugal	5	1991	2004
Spain	8	1982	2007
Sweden	20	1948	2010
U.K.	11	1965	2010
U.S.A.	15	1956	2012

Table 4 provides variable descriptions for our aggregate-level TSCS analyses.

In constructing top-income, mean-income, and top-share measures from WTID datasets, the exact country data series employed varies depending on availability. Our rule for measuring the incomes of the top $X\%$ is as follows:

1. Use Top $X\%$ Average Income series, or where not available. . .
2. Use Top $X\%$ Average income, adults, or where not available. . .
3. Use Top $X\%$ Average Income (LAD [Longitudinal Administrative Data]), or where not available. . .
4. Use Top $X\%$ Average Income, married couples and single adults.

Table 4: Descriptions of variables used in the aggregate-level TSCS analyses.

Variable Label	Description	Source
$VoteShare_{i,e}$	Vote share of party of the incumbent prime minister	Döring and Manow (2012).
$Tenure_{i,t}$	Years the incumbent party of the incumbent prime minister has held the post	Calculated from Döring and Manow (2012).
$Growth_{i,t}^M$	Growth rate of mean-income, as measured by GDP per capita.	Bolt and van Zanden (2013).
$Growth_{i,t}^{TX}$	Growth rate of income of the top ‘X’ percent of the income distribution.	Alvarez et al. (2012).
$Share_{i,t}^{TX}$	Share of income of the top ‘X’ percent of the income distribution.	Alvarez et al. (2012).
$Unemployment_{i,t}$	Unemployment rate.	OECD statistics portal.
$Inflation_{i,t}$	Inflation rate	Armingeon et al. (2007).
$Clarity_{i,t}$	Clarity of responsibility index based on Tavits (2007).	Calculated from Döring and Manow (2012).

Our rule for measuring mean income is as follows:

1. Use Average Income per Tax Unit, or where not available. . .
2. Use Average Income per Adult, or where not available. . .
3. Use Average Income per Tax Unit (adults), or where not available. . .
4. Use Average Income per Tax Unit (married couples and single adults).

Our rule for measuring the income share of the top X% is as follows:

1. Use Top X% Income Share, or where not available. . .
2. Use Top X% Income Share, adults, or where not available. . .
3. Use Top X% Income Share (LAD [Longitudinal Administrative Data]), or where not available. . .
4. Use Top X% Income Share, tax data, or where not available. . .
5. Use Top X% Income Share (IDS [Income Distribution Survey]), or where not available. . .

6. Use Top X% Income Share, married couples and single adults.

Following Tavits (2007), $Clarity_{i,t}$ (employed in robustness tests below) is calculated as an index such that:

$$Clarity_{i,t} = \frac{[1 - Std(ENP_{i,t})] + [1 - Minority_{i,t}] + Std(Tenure_{i,t})}{3}, \quad (1)$$

where $ENP_{i,t}$ denotes the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979), $Minority_{i,t}$ denotes a dummy variable for whether an incumbent government holds only a minority of seats in the lower house, and $Tenure_{i,t}$ denotes the years for which the party of the incumbent prime minister has held that post (uninterrupted by anything other than a caretaker government). The $Std(\cdot)$ function denotes standardization of its argument such that the variable is linearly rescaled to be $\in [0, 1]$, with the sample minimum corresponding to 0 and the sample maximum to 1. When constructing her measure of ‘clarity of responsibility’, Tavits (2007) also uses data on parliamentary committee structure, but these data are not available for non-trivial portions of our sample period, so we do not include them here.

2 The Specification of Our Empirical Models

2.1 Modelling Response to Inequality

The question that we wish to answer in this section is: what is the appropriate specification for our empirical models in order to test for responses to inequality in vote choice and vote share? To begin, we define:

$$\Delta Inequality_t \equiv G_t^T - G_t^M, \quad (2)$$

where G denotes a growth rate, and M and T denote mean and ‘top’ income, respectively. Thus, we have defined an inequality metric that is sensitive to differences between a top income group and the remainder of the population. Where top-income growth is the same as mean income

growth, there is no change in the relative incomes of the two groups, and so inequality does not change. Where top-income growth is higher (lower) than mean income growth, the income of the top group increases (decrease) relative to the non-top group. As top-income growth is included in mean-income growth, this change in *Inequality* is larger than it might appear at first because higher-than-mean growth for the top group mechanically implies lower-than-mean growth for the remainder.

With (2) in hand, one natural empirical specification would appear to be:

$$V_{i,t} = \beta'_0 + \beta'_1 \cdot G_t^M + \beta'_2 \cdot \Delta Inequality_t + \epsilon'_t \quad (3)$$

$$= \beta'_0 + \beta'_1 \cdot G_t^M + \beta'_2 \cdot (G_t^T - G_t^M) + \epsilon'_t, \quad (4)$$

where V denotes vote share/choice. As (3) shows, this approach provides a direct estimate of the effect of changing inequality via β'_2 , whilst controlling for mean-income growth — which we wish to do in order to accord with the prevailing economic voting literature. We simply use (2) to move from (3) to (4). In doing so, it becomes clear that (3) is not such a desirable specification because it muddies the waters when interpreting the coefficient on mean-growth. Specifically, differentiating (4) with respect to G_t^M , we get:

$$\frac{\partial V_t}{\partial G_t^M} = \beta'_1 - \beta'_2. \quad (5)$$

Thus, with this specification, while we directly estimate the effect of changes in inequality, we cannot perform inferences on the coefficient on mean-income growth (β'_1), but must subtract the top-income growth coefficient, first.

Rather than take this slightly cumbersome approach, we use the same specification adopted by L. M. Bartels (2008, Chapter 4), and estimate equations of the form:

$$V_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot G_{i,t}^M + \beta_2 \cdot G_{i,t}^T + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (6)$$

Now, it is easy to see that (6) still yields the same direct estimate of the effect of changing inequality as (3). We can simply differentiate both (6) and (4) with respect to G_t^T , which yields:

$$\frac{\partial V_{i,t}}{\partial G_{i,t}^T} = \beta_2 = \beta_2' \quad (7)$$

Furthermore, as noted above, β_2' is also the direct estimate of the effect of changes in *Inequality*_{*t*}. Finally, if we differentiate (6) with respect to G_t^M , it is apparent that we can perform inferences regarding mean-income growth directly from the estimates for a single parameter in the model (β_1):

$$\frac{\partial V_{i,t}}{\partial G_{i,t}^M} = \beta_1 . \quad (8)$$

2.2 Controlling for Party Identification

Following L. M. Bartels (2008), our model of incumbent voting (Model 1; see section 3 of the paper) includes a measure of party identification (*ProPartyID*). Including the measure controls for confounding between patterns of income growth and the partisan identity of governments, and also increases the precision of our estimates by soaking up individual-level variation in vote choice.

One possible concern with this approach is the possibility that party identification, at least as measured, might mediate the influence of inequality with respect to vote choice. In particular, *Growth*^{Top5} in an election year may have a short-run negative impact on *ProPartyID*, which, in turn, influences vote choice. If so, including *ProPartyID* in our models might be “masking” a sensible, but indirect, negative effect of inequality on incumbent support.

In this section, we report parameter estimates for models without a control for *ProPartyID*. We further consider whether any differences in findings for models with and without this control reflect the mediation of inequality-aversion through party identification or, more simply, a correlation (for other reasons) between patterns of income growth and the partisan complexion of governments. We adduce several pieces of evidence that the positive relationship between inequality

and incumbent support in our election-study analyses (captured in the coefficient on $Growth^{Top5}$) does *not* reflect an anterior, negative relationship between $Growth^{Top5}$ and $ProPartyID$.

We begin by reporting the results of models that exclude party identification. The relevant analyses are in Tables 5, 8, 6, and 7, respectively, for the U.S., Canada, Sweden and the U.K. Each table contains five models: as in the paper, for each country we estimate the vote model for the whole sample and, in separate estimations, for lower- and middle-income earners, controlling first for mean growth and then for a tercile-specific growth measure. A statistically significant demand for inequality remains in most settings across three countries: in the whole sample and among middle-income earners in the U.S.; in the whole sample and among low-income earners in Sweden; and, among middle-income earners in the U.K. Compared to the models reported in the main paper, excluding party ID only affects basic findings (i.e., brings p-values on $Growth^{Top5}$ above conventional levels of statistical significance) for two samples: low-income voters in the U.S. and the full electorate in the U.K.

Table 5: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in American presidential elections (1968–2012), no party-identification control.

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)			(5)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$															
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.23	0.04	0.00	-0.49	0.19	0.01	-0.49	0.19	0.01	-0.22	0.04	0.00	-0.22	0.04	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	1.52	1.19	0.20	2.71	4.01	0.50				1.53	1.12	0.17			
$Growth_t^{Q1-2M}$							2.23	1.66	0.18						
$Growth_t^{Q3M}$													1.13	0.85	0.18
$Growth_t^{T5M}$	3.01	0.65	0.00	0.85	3.12	0.78	1.27	2.08	0.54	3.21	0.57	0.00	3.54	0.42	0.00
$Intercept$	0.37	0.07	0.00	0.80	0.39	0.04	0.82	0.39	0.03	0.32	0.07	0.00	0.33	0.07	0.00
Log Likelihood	-49197			-12322			-12316			-15856			-15856		
BIC	98432			24677			24665			31746			31747		
Pseudo R^2	0.01			0.02			0.02			0.01			0.01		
N	14465			3932			3932			4738			4738		
N of elections	12			12			12			12			12		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Low			Mid			Mid		

We speak below to reasons why we believe that including a control for party identification is appropriate. It is in any case important to note that (a.) the demand-for-inequality results reported in the paper are mostly robust to the exclusion of this control and (b.) under either specification, we see almost no evidence of a “sensible” *aversion* to inequality, among full electorates or low- and middle-income groups. The $Growth^{Top5}$ coefficient is negatively signed and

Table 6: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Swedish parliamentary elections (1968–2010), no party-identification control.

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)			(5)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$															
$\log Tenure_t$	0.33	0.06	0.00	0.33	0.06	0.00	0.27	0.06	0.00	0.41	0.09	0.00	0.34	0.10	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	0.86	4.64	0.85	1.27	3.61	0.72				2.22	5.47	0.69			
$Growth_t^{Q1-2}$							4.29	1.54	0.01						
$Growth_t^{Q3}$													8.63	6.09	0.16
$Growth_t^{P95}$	5.65	2.93	0.05	4.55	2.51	0.07	4.69	1.54	0.00	5.38	3.13	0.09	2.98	3.60	0.41
<i>Intercept</i>	-1.26	0.19	0.00	-1.32	0.17	0.00	-1.22	0.17	0.00	-1.32	0.26	0.00	-1.19	0.24	0.00
Log Likelihood	-73462			-24899			-24833			-25001			-24898		
BIC	146964			49834			49703			50038			49832		
Pseudo R^2	0.05			0.04			0.05			0.06			0.07		
N	26213			9188			9188			8950			8950		
N of elections	16			16			16			16			16		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Low			Mid			Mid		

Table 7: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in British parliamentary elections (1964–2010), no party-identification control.

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)			(5)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$															
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.23	0.06	0.00	-0.63	0.05	0.00	-0.67	0.09	0.00	-0.36	0.06	0.00	-0.35	0.06	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	-5.03	2.64	0.06	-11.84	3.72	0.00				-11.47	2.92	0.00			
$Growth_t^{P20}$							-7.37	2.09	0.00						
$Growth_t^{P50}$													-6.47	2.00	0.00
$Growth_t^{P95}$	2.41	1.87	0.20	3.86	2.76	0.16	-2.82	1.21	0.02	6.55	1.79	0.00	3.88	1.92	0.04
<i>Intercept</i>	0.27	0.14	0.04	1.19	0.14	0.00	1.34	0.23	0.00	0.62	0.16	0.00	0.51	0.16	0.00
Log Likelihood	-65565			-16028			-16019			-17623			-17668		
BIC	131172			32091			32073			35282			35371		
Pseudo R^2	0.01			0.04			0.04			0.01			0.01		
N	28434			7376			7376			7446			7446		
N of elections	12			11			11			11			11		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Low			Mid			Mid		

Table 8: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Canadian parliamentary elections (1965–2011), no party-identification control.

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)			(5)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$															
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.05	0.07	0.43	0.01	0.07	0.89	0.06	0.05	0.30	-0.02	0.07	0.73	-0.03	0.09	0.77
$Growth_t^M$	4.33	3.42	0.21	4.08	3.71	0.27				5.35	2.80	0.06			
$Growth_t^{Q1-2}$							4.34	2.69	0.11						
$Growth_t^{Q3}$													6.24	6.28	0.32
$Growth_t^{T5M}$	3.48	2.89	0.23	2.96	3.18	0.35	5.95	3.32	0.07	2.36	2.99	0.43	2.11	2.16	0.33
<i>Intercept</i>	-0.39	0.09	0.00	-0.50	0.09	0.00	-0.67	0.15	0.00	-0.46	0.09	0.00	-0.45	0.08	0.00
Log Likelihood	-70468			-17830			-11270			-22315			-13815		
BIC	140977			35697			22576			44668			27666		
Pseudo R^2	0.01			0.01			0.01			0.01			0.01		
N	32222			8977			6990			10109			7652		
N of elections	15			15			11			15			11		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Low			Mid			Mid		

statistically significant only among low-income earners in the U.K., and only when controlling for income growth at the bottom rather than mean growth. Any effect of excluding *ProPartyID* from the models is essentially to increase evidence of indifference to, rather than demand for, inequality.

In sum, under either specification, we find almost no evidence that non-rich voters in the four countries vote to advance their distributive interests at the ballot box. Equally important, the aggregate-level TSCS analyses in the paper yield evidence of CBEV—and, in particular, of a positive *demand* for inequality—in a much broader OECD context without controlling for party identification.

The paper’s substantive findings are thus only modestly affected by the choice about whether to include or exclude party identification in the election-study models. Nonetheless, in the remainder of this section, we address the appropriateness of including this control by considering whether party identification itself appears to be negatively affected by top-income growth in the previous year (and, thus, could potentially be mediating a negative effect of inequality on votes for the incumbent). We point to two key pieces of evidence on this point.

First, we find little indication of a negative correlation between $Growth^{Top5}$ and *ProPartyID*. Tables 9, 12, 11, and 10 present estimates of models of incumbent party identification containing $Growth^M$, $Growth^{Top5}$, and $\log Tenure_t$, first for the whole sample and then separately for low- and middle-income earners. In three of the four countries there is not a hint of a relationship — positive *or* negative — between top-5-percent income growth and party identification. Only in the U.S., in Table 9, do we detect a weak (non-statistically-significant) negative relationship. We note, however, that (as discussed above) findings of demand-for-inequality for the full electorate and for middle-income voters are robust to the exclusion of a party ID control.

Second, in models of *ProPartyID*, the relative magnitudes of the coefficients on $Growth^{Top5}$ across the four countries are inconsistent with a causal interpretation from the latter to the former, given broader comparative findings on the stability of party identification. Notwithstanding ongoing methodological debate about how best to model the stability of party ID (e.g. B. L.

Table 9: Parameter estimates from OLS models of incumbent party identification in American presidential elections (1968–2012).

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.05	0.07	0.50	-0.18	0.20	0.39	-0.06	0.08	0.49
$Growth_t^M$	1.95	1.93	0.34	3.95	5.83	0.52	1.67	2.35	0.50
$Growth_t^{T5M}$	-2.16	1.35	0.15	-4.30	4.07	0.32	-2.08	1.64	0.24
<i>Intercept</i>	0.10	0.12	0.42	0.32	0.36	0.40	0.11	0.15	0.45
R^2	0.31			0.23			0.25		
N	12			12			12		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Mid		

Table 10: Parameter estimates from OLS models of incumbent party identification in British parliamentary elections (1964–2010).

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.05	0.03	0.08	-0.20	0.05	0.00	-0.11	0.03	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	-0.61	1.26	0.64	-3.41	2.03	0.14	-3.41	1.16	0.02
$Growth_t^{P95}$	0.23	0.92	0.81	0.77	1.36	0.59	1.82	0.77	0.05
<i>Intercept</i>	0.50	0.07	0.00	0.86	0.12	0.00	0.66	0.07	0.00
R^2	0.36			0.74			0.74		
N	12			11			11		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Mid		

Table 11: Parameter estimates from OLS models of incumbent party identification in Swedish parliamentary elections (1968–2010).

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$\log Tenure_t$	0.06	0.03	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.15
$Growth_t^M$	-0.26	2.14	0.91	-0.20	2.13	0.93	-0.12	2.97	0.97
$Growth_t^{P95}$	0.66	1.58	0.68	0.17	1.57	0.92	0.87	2.20	0.70
<i>Intercept</i>	0.02	0.07	0.79	0.02	0.07	0.75	0.03	0.09	0.73
R^2	0.30			0.28			0.22		
N	15			15			15		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Mid		

Table 12: Parameter estimates from OLS models of incumbent party identification in Canadian parliamentary elections (1965–2011).

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$\log Tenure_t$	0.01	0.04	0.78	0.01	0.04	0.76	0.01	0.04	0.73
$Growth_t^M$	0.12	2.06	0.95	0.97	2.05	0.65	0.07	2.03	0.97
$Growth_t^{T5M}$	0.50	1.87	0.80	0.31	1.87	0.87	0.10	1.85	0.96
<i>Intercept</i>	0.28	0.08	0.01	0.25	0.08	0.01	0.27	0.08	0.01
R^2	0.03			0.07			0.01		
N	15			15			15		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Mid		

Bartels et al., 2011; Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009), party identification has been commonly found to be a *more* stable orientation in the U.S. than in other advanced democracies (LeDuc, 1981; see also Schickler and Green, 1997). We would thus expect party ID in the United States to be less susceptible to influence by short-run economic conditions than party ID elsewhere. Yet the only place where we find a hint of a negative correlation between election-year top-income growth and pro-incumbent party identification is in the United States (see Table 9) — precisely where a substantial *causal* effect on party ID is least plausible. Not only is the correlation between $Growth^{Top5}$ and $ProPartyID$ in the U.S. weak, but the cross-national pattern of correlations also cuts against the possibility that any such correlation reflects endogeneity of $ProPartyID$ to election-year top-income growth.

In sum, (a.) the choice about the inclusion or exclusion of a party-identification control is only modestly consequential for our conclusions, and (b.) we can find little evidence that its inclusion could plausibly be masking a negative effect of inequality on votes for the incumbent.

3 Moderation of Individual-Level Results by Top-Income Shares

Table 13: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in American presidential elections (1968–2012). $Share^{T5}$ moderates the effect of $Growth^{T5M}$ in the full sample and among middle-income earners.

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$									
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.31	0.07	0.00	-0.45	0.08	0.00	-0.29	0.06	0.00
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	1.69	0.08	0.00	1.63	0.08	0.00	1.69	0.08	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	-13.46	4.00	0.00	-15.42	1.77	0.00	-14.75	5.27	0.01
$Share_t^{T5}$	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.53	-0.04	0.01	0.00
$Growth_t^{T5M}$	37.12	3.94	0.00	20.13	5.78	0.00	40.02	4.61	0.00
$Share_t^{T5} \times Growth_t^{T5M}$	-1.37	0.22	0.00	-0.36	0.35	0.30	-1.50	0.27	0.00
<i>Intercept</i>	1.20	0.21	0.00	1.17	0.16	0.00	1.35	0.25	0.00
Log Likelihood	-27771			-7042			-9045		
BIC	55609			14143			18149		
Pseudo R^2	0.44			0.44			0.44		
N	14465			3932			4738		
N of elections	12			12			12		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Mid		

Table 14: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Swedish parliamentary elections (1968–2010). $Share^{T5}$ moderates the effect of $Growth^{P95}$ in the full sample and among middle-income earners.

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$									
$\log Tenure_t$	0.22	0.06	0.00	0.24	0.04	0.00	0.31	0.10	0.00
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	2.61	0.10	0.00	2.55	0.11	0.00	2.58	0.15	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	-5.37	2.50	0.03	-4.09	2.39	0.09	-3.69	3.60	0.30
$Growth_t^{P95}$	54.76	10.40	0.00	43.30	9.68	0.00	48.08	14.49	0.00
$Share_t^{T5}$	0.08	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.07	0.04	0.05
$Share_t^{T5} \times Growth_t^{P95}$	-3.02	0.58	0.00	-2.32	0.53	0.00	-2.65	0.81	0.00
<i>Intercept</i>	-2.44	0.31	0.00	-2.00	0.21	0.00	-2.48	0.44	0.00
Log Likelihood	-49330			-16444			-16712		
BIC	98730			32951			33486		
Pseudo R^2	0.28			0.28			0.31		
N	22690			7797			7830		
N of elections	15			15			15		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Mid		

Table 15: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in British parliamentary elections (1964–2010). Here we do not find the same moderating effect of $Share^{T5}$ as in the aggregate-level TSCS analysis; indeed there is a moderating effect in the opposite direction.

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$									
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.22	0.07	0.00	-0.48	0.07	0.00	-0.25	0.08	0.00
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	2.64	0.06	0.00	2.69	0.10	0.00	2.61	0.08	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	-9.08	2.76	0.00	-10.11	2.67	0.00	-8.91	3.17	0.00
$Share_t^{T5}$	-0.03	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.77	-0.03	0.01	0.04
$Growth_t^{P95}$	-9.98	4.22	0.02	-2.90	4.17	0.49	-7.13	6.16	0.25
$Share_t^{T5} \times Growth_t^{T5}$	0.69	0.22	0.00	0.40	0.17	0.02	0.61	0.29	0.04
<i>Intercept</i>	-0.21	0.23	0.36	-0.26	0.28	0.35	-0.19	0.33	0.55
Log Likelihood	-29953			-7057			-8169		
BIC	59977			14175			16400		
Pseudo R^2	0.55			0.58			0.54		
N	28402			7374			7435		
N of elections	12			11			11		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Mid		

Table 16: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Canadian parliamentary elections (1965–2011). $Share^{T5}$ moderates the effect of $Growth^{T5M}$ in the full sample and among middle-income earners.

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$									
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.06	0.07	0.38	0.01	0.06	0.82	-0.02	0.10	0.87
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	1.95	0.14	0.00	2.04	0.21	0.00	2.01	0.15	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	5.80	2.67	0.03	6.01	2.47	0.01	7.85	4.08	0.05
$Share_t^{T5}$	0.05	0.03	0.14	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.04	0.03	0.28
$Growth_t^{T5M}$	53.43	22.02	0.02	24.49	25.91	0.34	51.89	25.14	0.04
$Share_t^{T5} \times Growth_t^{T5M}$	-1.97	0.87	0.02	-0.89	1.04	0.39	-1.94	1.00	0.05
<i>Intercept</i>	-2.24	0.82	0.01	-2.08	0.73	0.00	-2.10	0.89	0.02
Log Likelihood	-46670			-11401			-14760		
BIC	93412			22866			29584		
Pseudo R^2	0.34			0.36			0.34		
N	31623			8794			9951		
N of elections	15			15			15		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Mid		

4 Robustness Tests: Individual-Level Analyses

In this section, we present a range of results that demonstrate the robustness of our inferences to various modelling choices. Table captions document these findings.

4.1 The U.S.

Table 17: **U.S.: Using income thresholds, rather than group means.** Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in American presidential elections (1952–2012). Substituting measures of growth in income percentiles for measures of mean growth within quantiles, which also adds four earlier elections to the analysis, does not affect inferences of a demand for inequality. Quantile threshold data come from Census Historical Table F-1 (All Races), <https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/families/2014/f01AR.xls>

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)			(5)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
<i>VoteIncumbent_{i,t}</i>															
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.36	0.11	0.00	-0.44	0.11	0.00	-0.44	0.10	0.00	-0.33	0.11	0.00	-0.30	0.10	0.00
<i>ProPartyID_{i,t}</i>	1.59	0.06	0.00	1.53	0.06	0.00	1.54	0.06	0.00	1.57	0.07	0.00	1.60	0.07	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	-2.14	5.22	0.68	-3.89	5.34	0.47				0.38	5.74	0.95			
$Growth_t^{P20}$							-3.65	1.64	0.03						
$Growth_t^{P40-60}$													-7.50	2.93	0.01
$Growth_t^{P95}$	11.64	1.49	0.00	11.64	2.10	0.00	14.38	2.52	0.00	11.15	2.40	0.00	18.80	3.29	0.00
<i>Intercept</i>	0.61	0.30	0.05	0.78	0.28	0.01	0.68	0.22	0.00	0.45	0.26	0.09	0.41	0.21	0.05
Log Likelihood	-40172			-10519			-10496			-12592			-12535		
BIC	80393			21080			21035			25228			25114		
Pseudo R^2	0.42			0.42			0.43			0.41			0.41		
N	18975			5244			5244			5947			5947		
N of elections	16			16			16			16			16		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Low			Mid			Mid		

Table 18: **U.S.: Alternative measure of income growth at the bottom.** Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in American presidential elections (1968–2012). Controlling for growth at the 20th percentile of income, rather than mean growth of the bottom-40 percent, does not affect the inference regarding $Growth^{T5M}$. Quantile threshold data come from Census Historical Table F-1 (All Races), <https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/families/2014/f01AR.xls>

	(1)		
	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$			
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.47	0.11	0.00
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	1.61	0.08	0.00
$Growth_t^{P20}$	-3.78	0.75	0.00
$Growth_t^{T5M}$	9.87	1.01	0.00
<i>Intercept</i>	0.70	0.21	0.00
Log Likelihood	-7073		
BIC	14188		
Pseudo R^2	0.44		
N	3932		
N of elections	12		
Income tercile(s)	Low		

4.2 Sweden

Table 19: **Sweden: Use of linear vs. logged $Tenure_t$.** Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Swedish parliamentary elections (1968–2010). $Growth_t^{T5}$ and $Growth_t^M$ inferences are affected by use of $\log Tenure_t$ as opposed to $Tenure_t$, but our decision to use the former in the main text, for consistency with the other country analyses, biases *against* the inference of a positive effect from $Growth_t^{T5}$.

	(1)			(2)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$						
$Tenure_t$	0.02	0.00	0.00			
$\log Tenure_t$				0.25	0.05	0.00
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	2.61	0.10	0.00	2.62	0.10	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	-1.72	3.54	0.63	0.26	4.16	0.95
$Growth_t^{P95}$	7.29	2.62	0.01	5.18	2.71	0.06
<i>Intercept</i>	-1.12	0.10	0.00	-1.37	0.15	0.00
Log Likelihood	-49660			-49678		
BIC	99370			99407		
Pseudo R^2	0.28			0.28		
N	22690			22690		
N of elections	15			15		
Income tercile(s)	All			All		

Table 20: **Sweden: Alternative measure of top-income growth.** Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Swedish parliamentary elections (1968–2010). Using solely WTID measures for mean and top-5% (“Top 5% Average Income Per Tax Unit” series) income growth, a clear demand-for-inequality remains in the full sample and among low-income earners.

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)			(5)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$															
$\log Tenure_t$	0.24	0.05	0.00	0.23	0.05	0.00	0.16	0.04	0.00	0.31	0.07	0.00	0.28	0.07	0.00
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	2.61	0.09	0.00	2.56	0.11	0.00	2.55	0.11	0.00	2.60	0.14	0.00	2.58	0.14	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	4.03	2.71	0.14	0.59	2.57	0.82				8.46	2.95	0.00			
$Growth_t^{Q1-2}$							5.08	0.96	0.00						
$Growth_t^{Q3}$													7.72	4.27	0.07
$Growth_t^{T5M}$	4.26	1.49	0.00	4.21	1.27	0.00	4.27	1.21	0.00	2.49	1.60	0.12	2.32	2.07	0.26
$Intercept$	-1.38	0.17	0.00	-1.40	0.15	0.00	-1.30	0.11	0.00	-1.50	0.21	0.00	-1.39	0.17	0.00
Log Likelihood	-49636			-16547			-16472			-16739			-16745		
BIC	99322			33139			32988			33522			33535		
Pseudo R^2	0.28			0.28			0.28			0.31			0.31		
N	22690			7797			7797			7830			7830		
N of elections	15			15			15			15			15		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Low			Mid			Mid		

Table 21: **Sweden: Using volatile SCB top-income measure.** Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Swedish parliamentary elections (1968–2010). Substituting Statistics Sweden’s highly volatile top-5 mean growth measure for Statistics Sweden’s P95 growth rates after 1980 eliminates the demand-for-inequality effect in this case.

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)			(5)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$															
$\log Tenure_t$	0.18	0.07	0.01	0.18	0.05	0.00	0.16	0.06	0.00	0.25	0.07	0.00	0.22	0.08	0.01
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	2.61	0.10	0.00	2.56	0.11	0.00	2.56	0.11	0.00	2.58	0.14	0.00	2.58	0.14	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	9.78	4.13	0.02	7.53	3.09	0.01				13.61	4.38	0.00			
$Growth_t^{Q1-2}$							5.27	1.46	0.00						
$Growth_t^{Q3}$													11.95	3.93	0.00
$Growth_t^{T5}$	-1.52	1.26	0.23	-0.60	1.07	0.58	1.37	0.53	0.01	-3.20	1.24	0.01	-1.33	0.84	0.11
$Intercept$	-1.23	0.16	0.00	-1.33	0.13	0.00	-1.25	0.15	0.00	-1.29	0.15	0.00	-1.22	0.16	0.00
Log Likelihood	-49737			-16541			-16533			-16715			-16729		
BIC	99523			33128			33110			33475			33503		
Pseudo R^2	0.28			0.28			0.28			0.31			0.31		
N	22690			7797			7797			7830			7830		
N of elections	15			15			15			15			15		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Low			Mid			Mid		

Table 22: **Sweden: Using alternative measure of income growth at bottom.** Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Swedish parliamentary elections (1968–2010). Controlling for growth at the 20th percentile of income, rather than a mixture of mean growth of the bottom-40 percent and growth at the 20th percentile, does not affect the inference regarding $Growth^{T5M}$. $Growth_t^{P20}$ is measured using the linear interpolation procedure described in section 1.1.4.

	(1)		
	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$			
$\log Tenure_t$	0.21	0.03	0.00
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	2.54	0.11	0.00
$Growth_t^{P20}$	3.43	0.98	0.00
$Growth_t^{P95}$	4.78	0.90	0.00
<i>Intercept</i>	-1.42	0.09	0.00
Log Likelihood	-16348		
BIC	32740		
Pseudo R^2	0.28		
N	7700		
N of elections	14		
Income tercile(s)	Low		

4.3 The U.K.

Table 23: **U.K.: Using logged vs. linear $Tenure_t$.** Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in British parliamentary elections (1964–2010). $Growth_t^{T5}$ and $Growth_t^M$ inferences are not meaningfully affected by use of $\log Tenure_t$ as opposed to $Tenure_t$.

	(1)			(2)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$						
$Tenure_t$	-0.03	0.01	0.00			
$\log Tenure_t$				-0.28	0.06	0.00
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	2.63	0.06	0.00	2.64	0.06	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	-5.41	3.22	0.09	-8.33	2.48	0.00
$Growth_t^{P95}$	2.48	2.75	0.37	4.45	2.30	0.05
<i>Intercept</i>	-1.01	0.09	0.00	-0.71	0.12	0.00
Log Likelihood	-30095			-30032		
BIC	60241			60115		
Pseudo R^2	0.54			0.54		
N	28402			28402		
N of elections	12			12		
Income tercile(s)	All			All		

4.4 Canada

Table 24: **Canada: Using linear, rather than logged, term for $Tenure$.** Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Canadian parliamentary elections (1968–2011). $Growth_t^{T5M}$ and $Growth_t^M$ inferences are not meaningfully affected by use of $\log Tenure_t$ as opposed to $Tenure_t$.

	(1)			(2)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$						
$Tenure_t$	-0.02	0.01	0.15			
$\log Tenure_t$				-0.10	0.06	0.12
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	1.95	0.14	0.00	1.94	0.14	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	8.23	3.27	0.01	8.07	3.40	0.02
$Growth_t^{T5M}$	2.72	3.16	0.39	3.13	3.15	0.32
<i>Intercept</i>	-1.08	0.14	0.00	-1.05	0.14	0.00
Log Likelihood	-46869			-46890		
BIC	93791			93832		
Pseudo R^2	0.33			0.33		
N	31623			31623		
N of elections	15			15		
Income tercile(s)	All			All		

Table 25: **Canada: Comparing primary and secondary specification results for low- and middle-income voters.** Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Canadian parliamentary elections (1979–2011). The results in this table speak to the demand-for-inequality results that appear only in our secondary specifications for low- and middle-income voters (as shown in models 3 and 5 in the paper). As the secondary models are estimated on a truncated sample of elections, as compared to our primary models for these voters, the question arises as to whether the difference in results arises from differences in the sample or from differences in the model specification. As we see below, we continue to find indifference to inequality in our primary specification, even when we restrict the sample to that employed for our secondary specification. Moreover, comparing BIC statistics within each pair of models reveals that the best fit — for both low- and middle-income earners — is provided when controlling for mean, rather than tercile-specific, income growth. For this reason, we emphasize the mean-growth specification in the paper (i.e., we conclude that Canadians are indifferent to inequality).

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$												
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.00	0.06	0.97	-0.06	0.05	0.25	-0.14	0.07	0.03	-0.16	0.06	0.01
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	2.04	0.18	0.00	2.05	0.19	0.00	1.95	0.16	0.00	1.95	0.16	0.00
$Growth_t^M$				20.22	5.76	0.00				17.80	6.37	0.01
$Growth_t^{Q^{1-2}}$	2.76	2.59	0.29									
$Growth_t^{Q^3}$							8.21	5.51	0.14			
$Growth_t^{T^5M}$	6.45	3.18	0.04	-0.85	2.96	0.77	3.39	2.07	0.10	0.22	3.43	0.95
$Intercept$	-1.28	0.21	0.00	-1.14	0.13	0.00	-0.99	0.12	0.00	-0.99	0.14	0.00
Log Likelihood	-7062			-6976			-9048			-8970		
BIC	14168			13997			18140			17984		
Pseudo R^2	0.37			0.37			0.34			0.34		
N	6832			6832			7527			7527		
N of elections	11			11			11			11		
Income tercile(s)	Low			Low			Mid			Mid		

Table 26: **Canada: Using only after-tax income measures, rather than mix of pre- and after-tax.** Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Canadian parliamentary elections (1983–2011). Confining the analysis to elections for which Statscan’s after-tax income measures are available for all income statistics does not affect inferences for $Growth^{T5M}$ or $Growth^M$.

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)			(5)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$															
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.24	0.12	0.04	-0.11	0.11	0.32	-0.24	0.11	0.03	-0.24	0.12	0.04	-0.31	0.11	0.00
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	1.71	0.10	0.00	1.76	0.13	0.00	1.76	0.12	0.00	1.73	0.09	0.00	1.72	0.08	0.00
$Growth_t^M$	12.98	6.71	0.05	16.25	6.44	0.01				11.72	6.47	0.07			
$Growth_t^{Q1-2}$							-0.39	3.60	0.91						
$Growth_t^{Q3}$													4.93	4.32	0.25
$Growth_t^{T5M}$	3.06	3.34	0.36	1.26	3.10	0.68	7.56	2.55	0.00	3.11	3.29	0.34	5.70	2.18	0.01
<i>Intercept</i>	-0.79	0.23	0.00	-1.00	0.21	0.00	-0.80	0.23	0.00	-0.81	0.22	0.00	-0.70	0.20	0.00
Log Likelihood	-25486			-5410			-5450			-7303			-7323		
BIC	51022			10864			10943			14649			14690		
Pseudo R^2	0.29			0.30			0.29			0.29			0.29		
N	21223			5656			5656			6408			6408		
N of elections	9			9			9			9			9		
Income tercile(s)	All			Low			Low			Mid			Mid		

Table 27: **Canada: Using alternative measure of income growth at the bottom.** Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Canadian parliamentary elections (1979–2011). Controlling for growth at the 20th percentile of income, rather than a mixture of mean growth of the bottom-40 percent and growth at the 20th percentile, does not affect the inference regarding $Growth^{T5M}$.

	(1)		
	b	se	p
$VoteIncumbent_{i,t}$			
$\log Tenure_t$	-0.01	0.05	0.91
$ProPartyID_{i,t}$	2.05	0.18	0.00
$Growth_t^{P20}$	11.70	4.76	0.01
$Growth_t^{T5M}$	3.50	2.41	0.15
<i>Intercept</i>	-1.27	0.17	0.00
Log Likelihood	-7010		
BIC	14065		
Pseudo R^2	0.37		
N	6832		
N of elections	11		
Income tercile(s)	Low		

5 Robustness Tests: Aggregate-level TSCS Analyses

In this section, we present a range of results that demonstrate the robustness of our inferences to specification choices, as well as a large selection of additional control variables. Table captions document these findings.

Table 28: **TSCS: Using linear vs. logged $Tenure$.** Model fit is worse when using $Tenure_{i,t}$ rather than $\log Tenure_{i,t}$ (as we do in the main text). However the moderating effect of $Share_t^{T5}$ remains strongly evident under this alternative specification.

	(1)			(2)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteShare_{i,e-1}^{PM}$	-0.18	0.04	0.00	-0.18	0.04	0.00
$Tenure_{i,t}$	-0.04	0.06	0.47	-0.04	0.06	0.55
$Growth_{i,t}^M$	22.06	9.79	0.04	26.68	10.02	0.02
$Growth_{i,t}^{T5M}$	16.01	10.33	0.14	93.21	32.02	0.01
$Share_{i,t}^{T5}$				-0.02	0.06	0.74
$Share_{i,t}^{T5} \times Growth_{i,t}^{T5M}$				-3.57	1.53	0.04
<i>Intercept</i>	4.58	1.34	0.00	4.67	1.99	0.03
R^2	0.12			0.13		
BIC	1442			1380		
N	225			213		
N countries	15			15		
Std. errors clustered	Ctry			Ctry		

Table 29: **TSCS: Country-level jackknife standard errors.** The finding of moderation of the effect of $Growth_{i,t}^{T5}$ by $Share_{i,t}^{T5}$ is robust to calculation of standard errors on the basis of country-level jackknife analysis.

	(1)			(2)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteShare_{i,e-1}^{PM}$	-0.15	0.04	0.00	-0.15	0.04	0.00
$\log Tenure_{i,t}$	-1.08	0.45	0.03	-1.02	0.50	0.06
$Growth_{i,t}^M$	20.60	11.52	0.10	25.14	11.30	0.04
$Growth_{i,t}^{T5M}$	16.31	10.62	0.15	87.98	37.28	0.03
$Share_{i,t}^{T5}$				-0.01	0.07	0.85
$Share_{i,t}^{T5} \times Growth_{i,t}^{T5M}$				-3.34	1.90	0.10
<i>Intercept</i>	4.85	1.49	0.01	4.78	2.24	0.05
R^2	0.15			0.15		
BIC	1436			1374		
N	225			213		
N countries	15			15		
Std. errors clustered	Ctry			Ctry		
Std. error type	Jknife			Jknife		

Table 30: **TSCS: Alternative “top-income” thresholds.** The finding of moderation of the effect of top-income growth is present when we define “top-income” to be that of the top 0.1%; it is not statistically significant for the top 10%, that is, we estimate a significant demand for inequality irrespective of the income share of the top 10%.

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteShare_{i,e-1}^{PM}$	-0.15	0.03	0.00	-0.15	0.04	0.00	-0.14	0.03	0.00	-0.15	0.04	0.00
$\log Tenure_{i,t}$	-1.07	0.43	0.02	-1.01	0.47	0.05	-1.03	0.43	0.03	-0.98	0.47	0.05
$Growth_{i,t}^M$	15.80	8.68	0.09	21.88	9.86	0.04	35.53	14.00	0.02	40.89	16.06	0.02
$Growth_{i,t}^{T10M}$	25.01	9.93	0.02	78.71	43.36	0.09						
$Share_{i,t}^{T10}$				-0.04	0.05	0.45						
$Share_{i,t}^{T10} \times Growth_{i,t}^{T10M}$				-1.74	1.54	0.28						
$Growth_{i,t}^{T0.1M}$							-0.94	2.34	0.69	8.63	4.34	0.07
$Share_{i,t}^{T0.1}$										0.30	0.13	0.04
$Share_{i,t}^{T0.1} \times Growth_{i,t}^{T0.1M}$										-3.45	1.07	0.01
<i>Intercept</i>	4.85	1.40	0.00	5.52	2.29	0.03	4.40	1.25	0.00	3.74	1.29	0.01
R^2	0.16			0.16			0.12			0.13		
BIC	1490			1431			1425			1353		
N	235			223			224			210		
N countries	16			16			16			16		
Std. errors clustered	Ctry			Ctry			Ctry			Ctry		

Table 31: **TSCS: Controlling for unemployment and inflation.** The finding of moderation of the effect of $Growth_{i,t}^{T5}$ by $Share_{i,t}^{T5}$ is robust to inclusion of the unemployment rate, as well as the change in the unemployment rate and the inflation rate.

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteShare_{i,e-1}^{PM}$	-0.17	0.04	0.00	-0.18	0.05	0.00	-0.20	0.04	0.00	-0.20	0.05	0.00
$\log Tenure_{i,t}$	-1.08	0.60	0.09	-1.03	0.65	0.14	-0.95	0.63	0.15	-0.87	0.70	0.24
$Unemployment_{i,t}$	-0.22	0.12	0.10	-0.20	0.12	0.11	-0.13	0.10	0.24	-0.11	0.10	0.30
$Growth_{i,t}^M$	42.98	14.54	0.01	54.96	13.50	0.00	43.93	16.99	0.02	49.39	18.48	0.02
$Growth_{i,t}^{T5M}$	9.88	9.35	0.31	76.82	25.21	0.01	3.01	6.78	0.66	77.63	33.50	0.04
$Share_{i,t}^{T5}$				0.04	0.07	0.57				0.01	0.10	0.94
$Share_{i,t}^{T5} \times Growth_{i,t}^{T5M}$				-3.13	1.30	0.03				-3.25	1.57	0.06
$\Delta Unemployment_{i,t}$							-0.60	0.26	0.04	-0.70	0.28	0.02
$Inflation_{i,t}$							0.06	0.11	0.63	0.07	0.13	0.58
<i>Intercept</i>	6.12	2.14	0.01	5.25	2.64	0.07	6.38	1.95	0.01	5.81	2.72	0.05
R^2	0.16			0.17			0.20			0.23		
BIC	1274			1223			1200			1147		
N	199			189			187			177		
N countries	15			15			15			15		
Std. errors clustered	Ctry			Ctry			Ctry			Ctry		

Table 32: **TSCS: Country fixed and random effects.** The finding of moderation of the effect of $Growth_{i,t}^{T5}$ by $Share_{i,t}^{T5}$ is robust to the inclusion of country fixed or random effects.

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteShare_{i,e-1}^{PM}$	-0.18	0.06	0.01	-0.20	0.06	0.00	-0.15	0.04	0.00	-0.15	0.04	0.00
$\log Tenure_{i,t}$	-1.34	0.49	0.02	-1.21	0.54	0.04	-1.08	0.44	0.02	-1.02	0.48	0.04
$Growth_{i,t}^M$	22.53	9.95	0.04	28.98	11.33	0.02	20.60	10.40	0.05	25.14	10.66	0.02
$Growth_{i,t}^{T5M}$	14.92	8.27	0.09	76.11	31.60	0.03	16.31	9.53	0.09	87.98	29.92	0.00
$Share_{i,t}^{T5}$				0.06	0.12	0.63				-0.01	0.06	0.82
$Share_{i,t}^{T5} \times Growth_{i,t}^{T5M}$				-2.95	1.58	0.08				-3.34	1.46	0.02
<i>Intercept</i>	6.25	2.43	0.02	5.42	4.12	0.21	4.85	1.41	0.00	4.78	1.86	0.01
R^2	0.15			0.15			0.15			0.15		
BIC	1416			1357			.			.		
N	225			213			225			213		
N countries	15			15			15			15		
Std. errors clustered	Ctry			Ctry			Ctry			Ctry		
Unit effects	fe			fe			re			re		
Unit	Ctry			Ctry			Ctry			Ctry		

Table 33: **TSCS: Party fixed and random effects.** The finding of moderation of the effect of $Growth_{i,t}^{T5}$ by $Share_{i,t}^{T5}$ is robust to the inclusion of party random, though not fixed, effects.

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteShare_{i,e-1}^{PM}$	-0.50	0.08	0.00	-0.52	0.08	0.00	-0.21	0.04	0.00	-0.22	0.04	0.00
$\log Tenure_{i,t}$	-1.43	0.68	0.05	-1.28	0.73	0.10	-1.44	0.58	0.01	-1.32	0.62	0.03
$Growth_{i,t}^M$	41.10	15.27	0.02	46.21	16.54	0.01	22.45	11.00	0.04	27.78	12.33	0.02
$Growth_{i,t}^{T5M}$	20.67	12.94	0.13	48.21	46.28	0.32	18.50	9.76	0.06	76.97	32.44	0.02
$Share_{i,t}^{T5}$				-0.05	0.11	0.62				0.04	0.07	0.56
$Share_{i,t}^{T5} \times Growth_{i,t}^{T5M}$				-1.28	2.35	0.59				-2.79	1.59	0.08
<i>Intercept</i>	18.77	3.27	0.00	20.17	4.02	0.00	6.80	1.75	0.00	6.00	2.46	0.01
R^2	0.13			0.13			0.15			0.15		
BIC	1342			1290			.			.		
N	225			213			225			213		
N countries	15			15			15			15		
Std. errors clustered	Ctry			Ctry			Ctry			Ctry		
Unit effects	fe			fe			re			re		
Unit	Party			Party			Party			Party		

Table 34: **TSCS: Time trend and clarity of responsibility.** The finding of moderation of the effect of $Growth_{i,t}^{T5}$ by $Share_{i,t}^{T5}$ is robust to the inclusion of a year trend, and also to the inclusion of a measure of ‘clarity of responsibility’ interacted with $Growth_{i,t}^M$. See notes above for full details of how $Clarity_{i,t}$ is calculated.

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
$VoteShare_{i,e-1}^{PM}$	-0.16	0.04	0.00	-0.16	0.04	0.00	-0.14	0.03	0.00	-0.14	0.03	0.00
$\log Tenure_{i,t}$	-0.94	0.44	0.05	-0.90	0.49	0.09	-0.98	0.45	0.05	-0.90	0.48	0.08
$Growth_{i,t}^M$	8.52	9.09	0.36	14.68	9.15	0.13	99.85	49.03	0.06	105.58	52.35	0.06
$Growth_{i,t}^{T5M}$	16.41	9.08	0.09	83.39	28.38	0.01	15.15	9.63	0.14	85.72	28.47	0.01
$Share_{i,t}^{T5}$				0.02	0.07	0.81				-0.02	0.07	0.77
$Share_{i,t}^{T5} \times Growth_{i,t}^{T5M}$				-3.14	1.36	0.04				-3.28	1.42	0.04
$Year_t$	-0.05	0.02	0.01	-0.05	0.02	0.02						
$Clarity_{i,t}$							2.55	3.45	0.47	2.20	3.61	0.55
$Clarity_{i,t} \times Growth_{i,t}^M$							-134.92	81.17	0.12	-137.88	88.89	0.14
<i>Intercept</i>	113.85	34.08	0.00	102.46	36.80	0.01	2.93	2.51	0.26	2.96	2.21	0.20
R^2	0.17			0.17			0.15			0.16		
BIC	1435			1375			1444			1383		
N	225			213			225			213		
N countries	15			15			15			15		
Std. errors clustered	Ctry			Ctry			Ctry			Ctry		

References

- Alvarez, Facundo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez (2012). *World Top Incomes Database*. URL: <http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/> (visited on 02/21/2013).
- Armingeon, Klaus, Philipp Leimgruber, Michelle Beyeler, and Sarah Menegale (2007). *Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2004*. Institute of Political Science, University of Bern. Bern, Switzerland.
- Bartels, Brandon L., Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Corwin D. Smidt, and Renée M. Smith (2011). “The dynamic properties of individual-level party identification in the United States”. *Electoral Studies* 30.1, pp. 210–222.
- Bartels, Larry M. (2008). *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bolt, Jutta and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2013). “The First Update of the Maddison Project; Re-Estimating Growth Before 1820”. Maddison-Project Working Paper No. 4.
- Clarke, Harold D and Allan L McCutcheon (2009). “The dynamics of party identification reconsidered”. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 73.4, pp. 704–728.
- Cribb, Jonathan, Andrew Hood, Robert Joyce, and David Phillips (2013). *Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality in the UK: 2013*. The Institute for Fiscal Studies. London, UK.
- Döring, Holger and Philip Manow (2012). *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov)*. An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies. Version 12/10.
- Laakso, Markku and Rein Taagepera (1979). ““Effective” Number of Parties: A Measure With Application to West Europe”. *Comparative Political Studies* 12.1, pp. 3–27.
- LeDuc, Lawrence (1981). “The Dynamic Properties of Party Identification: a Four-Nation Comparison”. *European Journal of Political Research* 9.3, pp. 257–268.

- Schickler, Eric and Donald Philip Green (1997). "The Stability of Party Identification in Western Democracies Results from Eight Panel Surveys". *Comparative Political Studies* 30.4, pp. 450–483.
- Tavits, Margit (2007). "Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption". *American Journal of Political Science* 51.1, pp. 218–229.