Kneeland, T;
(2016)
Coordination under Limited Depth of Reasoning.
Games and Economic Behavior
, 96
pp. 49-64.
10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.011.
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Abstract
This paper provides the first unified explanation of behavior in coordinated attack games under both public and private information. It demonstrates that the main experimental results, such as threshold strategies, comparative statics, and the differences in behavior under public and private information, are robust predictions of limited depth of reasoning models. This is in contrast to equilibrium, which mispredicts the coordinating roles of public and private information. The analysis has implications for understanding macroeconomic phenomena, like currency attacks and debt crises, which are commonly modeled using incomplete information coordinated attack games.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Coordination under Limited Depth of Reasoning |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.011 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.011 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | © 2016 Elsevier Inc. This manuscript is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial Non-derivative 4.0 International license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). This license allows you to share, copy, distribute and transmit the work for personal and non-commercial use providing author and publisher attribution is clearly stated. Further details about CC BY licenses are available at http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0. Access may be initially restricted by the publisher. |
| Keywords: | Coordination games; Level-k models; Cognitive hierarchy models; Global games |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1474662 |
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