Oruc, S.; (2015) Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) as a Congestion Management Scheme in Electricity Transmission: Strategic Behavior in a Coupled FTR — Electricity Market Model. In: Dolan, T. and Collins, B., (eds.) International Symposium for Next Generation Infrastructure Conference Proceedings: 30 September - 1 October 2014 International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA),Schloss Laxenburg, Vienna, Austria. (pp. pp. 85-88). UCL STEaPP: London, UK.

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Abstract

With the emergence of liberalized markets, transmission line congestion has been a prominent technical constraint that has to be accounted for in designing the new markets. Transmission line congestion is a phenomenon in electricity markets that emerges more severely in time with ever increasing demand in electricity and resultant excessive loading of transmission lines. Various congestion management techniques such as market splitting, market coupling etc. are utilized currently in energy markets. However on the long run financial transmission rights (FTR), which is readily used by some US electricity market operators such as PJM, New York and New England operators, has potential to dominate other markets too. Modelling financial transmission rights to test some strategic hypotheses is imperative to be able to introduce suitable policies and regulations. In this paper we present a modelling approach for financial transmission rights and examine strategic use of hidden knowledge in a hypothetical electricity — FTR market.

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