Matros, A.;
(2003)
Private provision of public goods in the local interaction model.
(ELSE Working Papers
69).
ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
This paper analyses the evolutionary version of the Public Good game (Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998)) when agents can use imitation and best reply decision rules. I provide a condition, which completely describes agent behavior in the long run, for any number of neighbors and any total number of agents. Moreover, it is shown that it is enough to have just one decision rule per agent in order to obtain the same long run outcomes. The paper gives an explanation why we might observe irrational cooperation in the rational World.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Private provision of public goods in the local interaction model |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2003 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Figures 1 and 2 are included as separate files |
| Keywords: | JEL classification: C70, C72, C73 |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14613 |
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