Sandroni, A.; Squintani, F.; (2004) The overconfidence problem in insurance markets. (ELSE Working Papers 116). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.

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Abstract

Adverse selection has long been recognized as a rationale for government intervention in in- surance markets and for the adoption of public compulsory insurance. A different rationale for compulsory insurance is that overconfident individuals may underinsure because they underes- timate the relevant risks. We show that government intervention is not a Pareto improvement in an adverse selection model with a significant fraction of overcon�dent agents. We underline that behavioral biases need not be the basis for government intervention. In fact, behavioral biases may overturn existing compelling reasons for intervention in the economy. Our model also delivers novel positive implications on aggregate variables that have been at the center of recent empirical investigation.

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