Jehiel, P.; Meyer-ter-Vehn, M.; Moldovanu, B.; Zame, B.; (2006) The limits of ex post implementation. (ELSE Working Papers 183). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.

Preview

PDF 14540.pdf Download (275kB)

Abstract

The sensitivity of Bayesian implementation to agents' beliefs about others suggests the use of more robust notions of implementation such as ex-post implementation, which requires that each agent' s strategy be optimal for every possible realization of the types of other agents. We show that the only deterministic social choice functions that are ex-post implementable in generic mechanism design frameworks with multi-dimensional signals, interdependent valuations and transferable utilities, are constant functions. In other words, deterministic ex-post implementation requires that the same alternative must be chosen irrespective of agents' signals. The proof shows that ex-post implementability of a non-trivial deterministic social choice function implies that certain rates of information substitution coincide for all agents. This condition amounts to a system of differential equations that are not satis�ed by generic valuation functions.

Download activity - last month

Export as CSVJSONXML

Download activity - last 12 months

Export as CSVJSONXML

Downloads by country - last 12 months

Export as CSVXMLJSON

Archive Staff Only

View Item