Belot, M.; Bhaskar, V.; van de Ven, J.; (2006) Social preferences in the public arena: evidence from a prisoner's dilemma game on a TV show. (ELSE Working Papers 221). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.

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Abstract

We analyze a large stakes prisoner's dilemma game played on a TV show. Players cooperate 40% of the time, demonstrating that social preferences are important; however, cooperation is significantly below the 50% threshold that is required for inequity aversion to sustain cooperation. Women cooperate significantly more than men, while players who have "earned" more of the stake cooperate less. A player's promise to cooperate is also a good predictor of his decision. Surprisingly, a player's probability of cooperation is unrelated to the opponent's characteristics or promise. We argue that inequity aversion alone cannot adequately explain these results; reputational concerns in a public setting might be more important.

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