Lakeman, G.J.T.; (2005) Disjunctive and intentionalist accounts of perception. Masters thesis , University of London.

Text U594099 Redacted.PDF Download (2MB)

Abstract

The claim that perceptual experience is intentional is often used to support a particular view of the nature of perceptual experience. According to this view, termed intentionalism, in having perceptual experience we are aware of physical objects, but this awareness does not require that there are any such objects in our environment. Intentionalism construes the presentation of such physical objects in experience in non relational terms being presented with an object in experience is not constituted by the occurrence of a relation to that object. I contrast intentionalism with another account of experience, naive realism, according to which perceptual experience of objects is constituted by relations between subjects and those objects. I argue that an appeal to the intentional ity of sensory experience does not support the claim that perceptual experience is as the intentionalist maintains it to be. It is true that perceptual experience fulfils the criteria we can give for a state being intentional. But there is no reason to suppose that all intentional ity is non-relational. And the general considerations that bear on issues of the relationality of intentional in fact provide some small degree of support for the alternative view that the directedness of objects of perceptual experience is relational.

Download activity - last month

Export as CSVXMLJSON

Download activity - last 12 months

Export as JSONXMLCSV

Downloads by country - last 12 months

Export as JSONXMLCSV

Archive Staff Only

View Item