Hofbauer, J.;
Sandholm, W.;
(2007)
Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics.
(ELSE Working Papers
285).
ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
We show that any evolutionary dynamic that satisfies three mild requirements— continuity, positive correlation, and innovation—does not eliminate strictly dominated strategies in all games. Likewise, we demonstrate that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics.
Type: | Working / discussion paper |
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Title: | Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007 |
Language: | English |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14372 |



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