Short, TL; (2014) How can we reconcile the following apparent truths: ‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle’? Opticon1826 , 16 , Article 8. 10.5334/Opt.Bs.

Preview

PDF 194-1429-1-PB.pdf Available under License : See the attached licence file. Download (1MB)

Abstract

I will argue that the two statements can be reconciled by Parsons's view which is inspired by a Meinongian ontology. I will assume these views together with Parsons's classification of fictional properties as ‘nuclear’ and ‘extra-nuclear’. This division of properties into types eliminates the requirement for the view to associate an object with a set of properties {goldenness, mountain-hood, existence} which is important as there is no existent golden mountain. I will throughout use italics for the names of properties and braces for sets. The titular question is a well-known problem for views of ficta since it appears that we believe both claims are true but they seem to be inconsistent. I understand 'ficta' to be any object or person described in fiction. I will argue that we can resolve the tension by adopting Parsons's view of ficta.

Download activity - last month

Export as CSVJSONXML

Download activity - last 12 months

Export as CSVJSONXML

Downloads by country - last 12 months

Export as CSVXMLJSON

Archive Staff Only

View Item