Shanks, DR; Newell, BR; (2014) The primacy of conscious decision making. Behavioral And Brain Sciences , 37 (1) 45 - 53. 10.1017/S0140525X13001507.

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Abstract

The target article sought to question the common belief that our decisions are often biased by unconscious influences. While many commentators offer additional support for this perspective, others question our theoretical assumptions, empirical evaluations, and methodological criteria. We rebut in particular the starting assumption that all decision making is unconscious, and that the onus should be on researchers to prove conscious influences. Further evidence is evaluated in relation to the core topics we reviewed (multiple cue judgment, deliberation without attention, and decision making under uncertainty), as well as priming effects. We reiterate a key conclusion from the target article, namely that it now seems to be generally accepted that awareness should be operationally defined as reportable knowledge, and that such knowledge can only be evaluated by careful and thorough probing. We call for future research to pay heed to the different ways in which awareness can intervene in decision making (as identified in our lens model analysis) and to employ suitable methodology in the assessment of awareness, including the requirements that awareness assessment must be reliable, relevant, immediate, an sensitive.

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