Ledeneva, AV;
(2013)
Russia's Practical Norms and Informal Governance: The Origins of Endemic Corruption.
Social Research
, 80
(4)
pp. 1135-1162.
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Abstract
Corruption in Russia is of endemic nature. This article traces its roots to traditional practices that formed a foundation of the present-day system of governance, often referred to as ‘sistema’. It demonstrates how the logic of ‘feeding,’ ‘joint responsibility’ and ‘Potemkin villages’ is reproduced in the reliance of Putin’s network-based governance system on such instruments as undeclared incentives, informal affiliations, hidden agendas and warning signals. Putin’s sistema gives dynamism to government’s economic and political projects by engaging personalized influence, but at the same time its informal and non-transparent nature creates a fertile ground for corruption and makes its mitigation difficult. I argue that corruption in Russia could not be effectively managed unless its leaders understand the system of governance they operate in and articulate its consequences, of which endemic corruption is one of the most devastating for the country.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | Russia's Practical Norms and Informal Governance: The Origins of Endemic Corruption |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
Publisher version: | https://muse.jhu.edu/article/541990/summary |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | Copyright © 2013 The New School. This article first appeared in Social Research: An International Quarterly 80:4 (2013), 1135-1162. Reprinted with permission by Johns Hopkins University Press. |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > SSEES |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1421771 |
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