Glynn, L;
(2013)
Causal foundationalism, physical causation, and difference-making.
Synthese
, 190
(6)
pp. 1017-1037.
10.1007/s11229-011-0058-7.
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Abstract
An influential tradition in the philosophy of causation has it that all token causal facts are, or are reducible to, facts about difference-making. Challenges to this tradition have typically focused on pre-emption cases, in which a cause apparently fails to make a difference to its effect. However, a novel challenge to the difference-making approach has recently been issued by Alyssa Ney. Ney defends causal foundationalism, which she characterizes as the thesis that facts about difference-making depend upon facts about physical causation. She takes this to imply that causation is not fundamentally a matter of difference-making. In this paper, I defend the difference-making approach against Ney’s argument. I also offer some positive reasons for thinking, pace Ney, that causation is fundamentally a matter of difference-making.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Causal foundationalism, physical causation, and difference-making |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-011-0058-7 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0058-7 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0058-7. |
| Keywords: | Causation, Difference-making, Causal foundationalism, Physical causation, Processes |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1406967 |
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