Makin, Edward Isaac; (2025) The Persistence of the Unperceived: How Can We Acquire a Notion of Mind-Independence? Masters thesis (M.Phil.Stud), UCL (University College London).

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Abstract

This thesis explores how we acquire a notion of mind-independence. It focuses on Berkeley’s Puzzle (Campbell and Cassam, 2014), which presents an inconsistent triad of propositions: i) Experientialism ii) Sensationism iii) Metaphysical Realism I critically examine two strategies for resolving the puzzle: rejecting experientialism or rejecting sensationism. First, I assess the plausibility of experientialism. I argue that neither concept empiricism nor Campbell’s essential role reading successfully establish experientialism. I then consider an argument for experientialism which can be found in Evans (1980). For Evans, objective thought requires grasp of simultaneous spatial concepts, and grasp of such concepts depends essentially on sensory experience. I apply pressure to this view by challenging the claim that grasp of simultaneous spatial concepts requires the capacity to apply such concepts directly in experience. Second, I examine the conceptual connection between the idea of space and the notion of an objective world. I argue against the Kantian thesis that grasp of the idea of space is necessary for objective thought. Third, I evaluate anti-sensationist responses to Berkeley’s Puzzle. Drawing on recent empirical work (Munton, 2025), I argue that Cassam’s sensationist representationalism is undermined, notably, by the objection that sensory experience cannot represent modal properties. I then discuss how the relational view can account for hallucinations. I suggest that a negative disjunctivist account of hallucinations is most promising. This thesis suggests that there is no decisive solution to Berkeley’s Puzzle. Nevertheless, the discussion informs future debate by presenting new observations and suggesting alternative avenues for inquiry. For example, I present a revised version of Strawson’s auditory world which plausibly allows for objective thought in a No-Space World. Additionally, I argue that considerations adduced from Strawson (1980) suggest that Campbell’s commitment to underlying mechanisms is redundant, and I offer a revised view.

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