Kato, Akihisa;
Ríos Rull, José Víctor;
(2023)
A protocol for repeated bargaining.
Economics Letters
, 227
, Article 111132. 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111132.
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Abstract
We propose a protocol for repeated bargaining where occasional periods of good outside opportunities yield improved outcomes but also higher breakout probabilities, yet there is a lot of risk sharing. Crucially, we only consider Markov perfect equilibria that have neither non payoff-relevant state variables that are costly to compute nor a contrived process of equilibrium selection.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | A protocol for repeated bargaining |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111132 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111132 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher's terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10214411 |
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