Craciun, Diana; (2024) What is the role of affective forecasting in knowing what we value? Philosophical Psychology 10.1080/09515089.2024.2403509. (In press).

Preview

PDF What is the role of affective forecasting in knowing what we value (1).pdf - Published Version Download (753kB) | Preview

Abstract

Generally, we confidently ascribe valuing states to ourselves. We make statements such as “I value democracy” or “I value my best friend” - our sense of who we are depends on doing so. Yet what justifies that confidence? If you were asked “Do you value philosophy, or are you just doing it for the money?”, how might you go about generating such knowledge? I will operate with the notion that valuing involves, at a minimum, a set of distinctive emotional dispositions toward the valued object. Given this view of valuing, a plausible explanation stemming from Tooming and Miyazono is the following: to know whether we value, we need to predict our potential or future emotional reactions. That is, they suggest that affective forecasting is necessary to generate knowledge of valuing states. I argue that, despite its intuitive appeal, affective forecasting is not necessary. I then consider a more modest claim, namely that affective forecasting is still explanatorily powerful when it comes to self-knowledge of valuing states, as it explains the difficulty of generating such knowledge. I reject this further claim, arguing that there is a stronger available explanation: the use of theories about valuing.

Download activity - last month

Export as JSONCSVXML

Download activity - last 12 months

Export as CSVXMLJSON

Downloads by country - last 12 months

Export as CSVXMLJSON

Archive Staff Only

View Item