Spinney, Oliver Thomas;
(2025)
Macdonald Before Quine on Truth by Convention.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
10.1111/papq.12487.
(In press).
Preview |
Text
Spinney_Pacific Philosophical Qtr - 2025 - Spinney - Macdonald Before Quine on Truth by Convention.pdf Download (256kB) | Preview |
Abstract
I show that Margaret Macdonald anticipated Quine's well-known criticisms of logical conventionalism in her unpublished 1934 PhD thesis, but that she later developed her criticisms in a direction distinct from that of Quine under the influence of Wittgenstein. Macdonald rejected as senseless the suggestion that statements of logical truth admit of justification, through an examination of the use to which such statements are put in ordinary speech.
Type: | Article |
---|---|
Title: | Macdonald Before Quine on Truth by Convention |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.1111/papq.12487 |
Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12487 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | Copyright © 2025 The Author(s). Pacific Philosophical Quarterly published by University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Keywords: | History of analytic philosophy; logical conventionalism; Margaret Macdonald; W. V. Quine; Wittgenstein |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10210057 |
Archive Staff Only
![]() |
View Item |