Semerani, Anita;
(2025)
Intention, agency, and belief.
Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).
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Abstract
The thesis is an investigation of the conditions of intentions and, particularly, of how certain beliefs about a course of action may constrain our process of intention formation. Overall, I will argue that the belief constraints on intentions are quite weak. Most of the belief conditions on intentions suggested in the literature should, I contend, either be rejected or endorsed in rather weak versions. Firstly, I argue against the two following constraints on intentions: that one cannot form an intention for a ‘state-given reason’; and that one cannot form an intention to act in some way unless one believes one has a reason for acting in that way. Secondly, I consider whether a constraint on intentions is constituted by beliefs about whether one will act as intended. I contend that we can form an intention to act in some way even without believing that we will perform the intended action, or while believing we will not do so. In these cases, I maintain, we form flat out intentions, and, not, e.g., intentions to try or conditional ones. I will also suggest, however, that we should endorse a very weak version of this constraint on intention. I then show how this, admittedly, very weak version helps us solve a famous puzzle about intention: the Toxin Puzzle. Thirdly, I argue that slightly more robust constraints on intentions are constituted by beliefs about control and about abilities. In particular, I maintain that a belief that one controls, in some way and to a certain degree, a course of action, and, relatedly, a belief that one possesses the ability to do it, or a suitably related one, are required in order to form an intention to act in that way.
| Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
|---|---|
| Qualification: | M.Phil |
| Title: | Intention, agency, and belief |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © The Author 2025. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10209441 |
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