Coen, David;
Vannoni, Matia;
(2025)
Politically Connected Firms: Trade, Competition and Rent-Seeking.
Governance
, 38
(3)
, Article e70024. 10.1111/gove.70024.
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Abstract
This paper examines how companies respond to global economic shocks by seeking political connections. Using company-level data, the study explores how exposure to increased trade competition—specifically, rising Chinese imports—affects U.S. firms' lobbying strategies. The findings reveal that companies facing greater economic pressures are more likely to hire politically connected lobbyists, particularly in industries more exposed to trade. These findings indicate that, during periods of economic instability, firms actively pursue political influence as a strategy to manage uncertainty and safeguard their interests.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Politically Connected Firms: Trade, Competition and Rent-Seeking |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/gove.70024 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70024 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author-accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | globalization, lobbying, political connections, trade |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Political Science |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10207818 |
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