Goh, Hseng Xiong Joshua;
(2024)
Degrees of causal contribution.
Doctoral thesis (Ph.D), UCL (University College London).
![[thumbnail of Goh_10202701_thesis.pdf]](https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/text.png) |
Text
Goh_10202701_thesis.pdf Access restricted to UCL open access staff until 1 January 2026. Download (1MB) |
Abstract
Consider the following four claims. (1) Compared to her drinking the shandy, Suzy’s drinking the moonshine was more a cause of her becoming drunk. (2) “[T]he driver’s drunkenness [w]as more of a cause of [the] car crash than the poor weather conditions” (Kaiserman 2018: 1). (3) “The popular disillusionment with the shuttle [Discovery], Mr. Liss said, is due more to a public relations failure on NASA’s part than to any engineering problems” (Harmon 2015). (4) “[T]he corruption […] of the [Western Roman] administration […] undoubtedly contributed to its final collapse in the fifth century. But the major cause of its fall was that it was […] exposed to [increasingly severe] barbarian onslaughts” (Jones 1964: 1067-1068). Drawn from different fields (including philosophy ((2)), science journalism ((3)), and historical studies ((4))), such claims seem to concern: the varying extents to which certain events (e.g., Suzy’s drinking the shandy, and Suzy’s drinking the moonshine) contributed to the causing of certain outcomes (e.g., Suzy’s becoming drunk). That is, such claims seemingly concern degrees of causal contribution. Concerning this concept of “degrees of causal contribution,” philosophical questions abound. This thesis will address such questions, some of which include the following. (a) In the first instance, can we make sense of claims like (1)–(4)? (Carolina Sartorio (2020: 347), for example, is sceptical that “we can make sense of degrees of causal contribution.”) (b) If we answer (a) with “yes”: are there various (and distinct) senses in which (1)–(4) may be true? (c) If we answer (a) and (b) with “yes”: how might this bear on some other philosophical issues (e.g., (degrees of) moral responsibility (for outcomes), and the MAKING relation (see Byrne 2021))?
| Type: | Thesis (Doctoral) |
|---|---|
| Qualification: | Ph.D |
| Title: | Degrees of causal contribution |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © The Author 2024. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10202701 |
Loading...
Loading...Loading...Loading...Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
