Heuer, Ulrike;
(2024)
The Point of Exclusionary Reasons.
In: Marmor, Andrei and Enoch, David and Brownlee, Kimberley, (eds.)
Engaging Raz.
Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.
(In press).
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The Point of Exclusionary Reasons_final.pdf - Accepted Version Access restricted to UCL open access staff until 23 May 2026. Download (466kB) |
Abstract
One of Joseph Raz’s signature contributions to the explanation of normativity is the introduction of the concept of an exclusionary reason (ER). As Raz sees it, ERs play a crucial role in the explanation of legitimate legal authority, but they are also ubiquitous outside of the legal domain. 1 My focus will be on their role in explaining the way in which moral or, at any rate, nonlegal obligations or duties normatively differ from ordinary first-order reasons.2 The concept of obligation is seen by some as the lynchpin for understanding morality.3 Others think that it is the emphasis on obligation and duty that has led modern ethics astray.4 I will not take issue with these discussions here. I will assume that there are obligations, and that they are different from other kinds of reasons. I hope that the explanation of obligations I offer helps to determine their role and relevance, but it is not my concern to establish any view about their importance. There are obligations of very different stripes (even setting legal ones aside): voluntary obligations (e.g., promissory obligations); obligations that arise from relationships such as being someone’s friend, lover, or relative; obligations that are part and parcel of being a member of a social group; role obligations, such as professional obligations; and obligations we have to everyone, strangers and close relations alike, such as obligations to respect their rights. The explanation of the obligation may differ in these cases, but there may also be salient similarities. A thread running through Raz’s writings on the explanation of practical normativity is the insistence that reasons generally are explained by their relation to value. In this paper, I will develop this view with regard to obligations.
Type: | Book chapter |
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Title: | The Point of Exclusionary Reasons |
ISBN-13: | 9780198925347 |
Publisher version: | https://global.oup.com/academic/product/engaging-r... |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher's terms and conditions. |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10200645 |
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