Leigh, Fiona;
(2020)
Self-Knowledge, Elenchus and Authority in Early Plato.
Phronesis
, 65
pp. 247-280.
10.1163/15685284-bja10020.
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Abstract
In some of Plato’s early dialogues we find a concern with correctly ascertaining the contents of a particular kind of one’s own psychological states, cognitive states. Indeed, one of the achievements of the elenctic method is to facilitate cognitive selfknowledge. In the Alcibiades, moreover, Plato interprets the Delphic injunction, ‘know yourself’, as crucially requiring cognitive self-knowledge, and ending in knowing oneself as subject to particular epistemic norms. Epistemic authority for self-knowledge is, for Plato, conferred on the basis of correct application of norms to cognitive selfascriptions, and not confined to the first-personal perspective. This implies firstpersonal plural epistemic authority for self-knowledge.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | Self-Knowledge, Elenchus and Authority in Early Plato |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.1163/15685284-bja10020 |
Publisher version: | http://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-bja10020 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | © The Author 2020. Original content in this paper is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). |
Keywords: | self-knowledge; elenchus; epistemic authority; dialogue; Alcibiades; Apology; Laches; Gorgias |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10200368 |
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