Kürbis, Nils;
(2024)
The Correspondence Theory of Truth.
In:
Reference Module in Social Sciences.
Elsevier: Amsterdam, Netherlands.
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Abstract
According to the correspondence theory of truth a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact. The present entry explains this definition, outlines an ontology of facts, and sketches a theory of meaning that naturally accompanies the correspondence theory of truth. It also discusses two major challenges the correspondence theory faces, related to the meanings of the logical expressions “not” and “all,” and surveys possible solutions.
Type: | Book chapter |
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Title: | The Correspondence Theory of Truth |
DOI: | 10.1016/B978-0-323-95504-1.00143-5 |
Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-95504-1.00143-5 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
Keywords: | Correspondence, Facts, Falsehood, Generality, Logical atomism, Meaning, Metaphysics, Negation, Ontology, Particulars, Propositions, Bertrand Russell, Truth, Universals |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10200034 |




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