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How firms respond to mandatory information disclosure

Doshi, Anil R; Dowell, Glen WS; Toffel, Michael W; (2013) How firms respond to mandatory information disclosure. Strategic Management Journal , 34 (10) pp. 1209-1231. 10.1002/smj.2055. Green open access

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Abstract

Mandatory information disclosure regulations seek to create institutional pressure to spur performance improvement. By examining how organizational characteristics moderate establishments' responses to a prominent environmental information disclosure program, we provide among the first empirical evidence characterizing heterogeneous responses by those mandated to disclose information. We find particularly rapid improvement among establishments located close to their headquarters and among establishments with proximate siblings, especially when the proximate siblings are in the same industry. Large establishments improve more slowly than small establishments in sparse regions, but both groups perform similarly in dense regions, suggesting that density mitigates the power of large establishments to resist institutional pressures. Finally, establishments owned by private firms outperform those owned by public firms. We highlight implications for institutional theory, managers, and policymakers.

Type: Article
Title: How firms respond to mandatory information disclosure
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2055
Publisher version: https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2055
Language: English
Additional information: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher's terms and conditions.
Keywords: information disclosure, institutional theory, environmental strategy, mandatory disclosure, environmental performance, regulation
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > UCL School of Management
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10195028
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