Letsas, George; (2025) Proportionality. In: Bellamy, Richard and King, Jeff, (eds.) The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory. (pp. 378-396). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.

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Abstract

Constitutions set out fundamental principles of political morality that bind institutional action and assign strong political rights to individuals. At surface level, the principle of proportionality is a methodological device. It operates as a doctrinal heading under which courts scrutinize state interference with individual liberty and assess the scope of their own authority. According to the orthodox understanding of proportionality, this scrutiny takes the form of balancing rights against public interest, which raises questions about the legitimacy of judicial review. This chapter argues that, contrary to the orthodox view, proportionality is primarily about the normative foundations of constitutional rights and the duty of courts to pursue, through principled legal reasoning, the moral truth about individual rights. On this rival account of proportionality, rights are equality-based moral norms constraining state action and no actual balancing takes place by courts. If we are to take seriously both the idea of fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality, we must abandon the misleading metaphor of balancing and the problems of incommensurability and judicial scepticism to which it leads.

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