Wen, W;
Charles, L;
Haggard, P;
(2023)
Metacognition and sense of agency.
Cognition
, 241
, Article 105622. 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105622.
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Abstract
Intelligent agents need to understand how they can change the world, and how they cannot change it, in order to make rational decisions for their forthcoming actions, and to adapt to their current environment. Previous research on the sense of agency, based largely on subjective ratings, failed to dissociate the sensitivity of sense of agency (i.e., the extent to which individual sense of agency tracks actual instrumental control over external events) from judgment criteria (i.e., the extent to which individuals self-attribute agency independent of their actual influence over external events). Furthermore, few studies have examined whether individuals have metacognitive access to the internal processes underlying the sense of agency. We developed a novel two-alternative-forced choice (2FAC) control detection task, in which participants identified which of two visual objects was more strongly controlled by their voluntary movement. The actual level of control over the target object was manipulated by adjusting the proportion of its motion that was driven by the participant's movement, compared to the proportion driven by a pre-recorded movement by another agent, using a staircase to hold 2AFC control detection accuracy at 70%. Participants identified which of the two visual objects they controlled, and also made a binary confidence judgment regarding their control detection judgment. We calculated a bias-free measure of first-order sensitivity (d’) for detection control at any given level of participant's own movement. The proportion of pre-recorded movements determined by the stairecase could then be used as an index of control detection ability. We identified two distinct processes underlying first-order detection of control: one based on instantaneous sensory predictions for the current movement, and one based on detection of a regular motor-visual relation across a series of movements. Further, we found large individual differences across 40 particpants in metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’) even though first-order sensitivity of control detection was well controlled. Using structural equation modelling (SEM), we showed that metacognition was negatively correlated with the predictive process component of detection of control. This result is inconsistent with previous hypotheses that detection of control relies on metacognitive monitoring of a predictive circuit. Instead, it suggests that predictive mechanisms that compute sense of agency may operate unconsciously.
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