Meyer, GJ;
Friston, KJ;
(2022)
The Active Bayesian Brain and the Rorschach Task.
Rorschachiana
, 43
(2)
pp. 128-150.
10.1027/1192-5604/a000158.
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Abstract
The Rorschach offers a unique and interesting paradigm from the perspective of the (Bayesian) brain. This contribution to the cross-disciplinary special issue considers the Rorschach from the perspective of perceptual inference in the brain and how it might inform subject-specific differences in perceptual synthesis. Before doing so, we provide a broad overview of active inference in its various manifestations. In brief, active inference supposes that our perceptions are the best hypothesis to explain sensory impressions. On a Bayesian account, the requisite belief updating rests sensitively upon the precision or confidence ascribed to sensory input, relative to prior beliefs about the causes of sensations. This focus - on the balance between sensory and prior precision - has been a useful construct in both cognitive science (e.g., as a formal explanation for attention) and neuropsychology (e.g., as a formal explanation for aberrant or false inference in hallucinations). In this setting, false inference is generally understood as abnormally high precision afforded to high-level hypotheses or explanations for visual input, which may compensate for a failure to attenuate sensory precision. On this view, the Rorschach offers an interesting paradigm because the amount of precise information about the causes of visual input is deliberately minimized - and rendered ambiguous - thereby placing greater emphasis on prior beliefs entertained by the respondent. We close by exploring this issue and several other areas of intersection between Rorschach responding and active inference.
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