Abadi, Aydin;
Murdoch, steven;
Zacharias, Thomas;
(2021)
Recurring Contingent Payment for Proofs of Retrievability.
(Paper 2021/1145
).
Cryptology ePrint Archive
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Abstract
Fair exchange protocols let two mutually distrusted parties exchange digital data in a way that neither can cheat. At CCS 2017, Campanelli et al. proposed two blockchain-based protocols for the fair exchange of digital coins and a certain service, i.e., “proofs of retrievability” (PoR), that take place between a buyer and seller. In this work, we identify two serious issues of these schemes; namely, (1) a malicious client can waste the seller’s resources, and (2) real-time leakage of information to non-participants in the exchange. To rectify the issues, we propose a “recurring contingent PoR payment” (RC-PoR-P). It lets the fair exchange reoccur while ensuring that the seller’s resources are not wasted, and the parties’ privacy is preserved. We implemented the RC- PoR-P. Our cost analysis indicates that the RC-PoR-P is efficient. The RC-PoR-P is the first of its kind that offers all the above features.
| Type: | Report |
|---|---|
| Title: | Recurring Contingent Payment for Proofs of Retrievability |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1145 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This work is licensed under an Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). |
| Keywords: | Cryptographic protocol, blockchain, smart contracts, fair exchange |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > Dept of Computer Science UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10153741 |
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