Hyman, J;
(2017)
II—Knowledge and Belief.
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
, 91
(1)
pp. 267-288.
10.1093/arisup/akx005.
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Abstract
In this article, I oppose the view that knowledge is a species of belief, and argue that belief should be defined in terms of knowledge, instead of the other way round. However, I reject the idea that the concept of knowledge has a primary or basic role or position in our system of mental and logical concepts, because I reject the hierarchical conception of philosophical analysis implicit in this idea. I approach the topic of knowledge and belief from a discussion of Richard Holton’s views about facts and factive verbs.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | II—Knowledge and Belief |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1093/arisup/akx005 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akx005 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10137503 |
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